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TAXI AND LIMOUSINES:
THE LAST BASTION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
Robert M. Hardaway*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There are a handful of jurisdictions that still transparently
regulate limousine service for the specific purpose of limiting
competition and protecting an incumbent oligopoly.' After twenty* Robert Hardaway is Professor of Law at the University of Denver
College of Law in Denver, Colorado. He is a graduate of Amherst College
(Cum Laude, with an Honors in Economics) and New York University Law
School (Cum Laude and Order of the Coif) where he was an editor on the New
York University Law Review. He has taught law and public policy at the
University of California-Hastings Law School and George Washington
University Law School in Washington, D.C. He has also served in the Judge
Advocate General's Corps of the United States Navy, and has practiced law
with a majorfirm in Denver, Colorado. He is the author of eight published
books, most of which deal with law and public policy. He is also the author of
twenty six scholarly articles and reviews published in major law reviews and
journals,many of which deal with transportation,regulation,and has published
forty editorial articles on public policy, including an article on taxicab
deregulation in the Christian Science Monitor. He has made numerous media
appearanceson CNN, CNBC, NBC, public television, and nationalpublic radio.
He has presented fourteen papers, mostly in the area of transportation
regulation, at various national conferences as well as for the Institute for
InternationalResearch in Sydney Australia. In 1985, he testified before the
Aviation Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Public Works
Committee on the subject of monopolization of airport resources. He recently
presented a paper to the executive staff and General Counsel of the Federal
Aviation Division of the Department of Transportationon the subject of anticompetitive practices in the airline industry and the monopolization of airport
resources.
I Gerald C.S. Mildner, and Lyrrette D. Podkranic, An Economic Analysis
of Taxi and Limousine Regulation in Las Vegas 29 (July 1999) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author). The authors identify six cities that are known to
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one years of deregulation in the airline industry and like demise of
regulation in the trucking and railroad businesses, there are few
remaining fields of economic endeavor which are regulated with
such a transparent purpose as those certain cities regulating the
entry of competition in the limousine business. Over the past
twenty years, vested interests in industry after industry have fallen
to the forces of deregulation. Citizens from several countries
around the world are demanding that governments regulate for the
2
public good rather than for the private profit of vested interests.
limit entry (Dallas, El Paso, Miami, New York, and Philadelphia. At least sixteen
cities, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Indianapolis, Portland, and San
Diego allow free entry. However, San Francisco is undergoing change. See also,
City Overhauls on Taxis Ready for Road Test, INTERNATIONAL TAXI AND LIVERY
ASSOCIATION DISPATCH (January 1999): In November, 1998, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors passed the final measures of taxi industry reforms. These
reforms were born out of the Mayor's Taxi Task force. Among the measures
passed: A first-ever cap on "gate fees"-the fees cab companies levy on cabbies who
do not hold their own operating permits-to use company owned taxis. The reforms
included an $1,800 per month cap on the amount permit holders can charge
companies to use their permits, known as medallions. Additionally, the measures
instituted a system that would allow a six-month trial period for designated cabpooling routes where two or more passengers to ride to a destination at a discount
rate. Lastly, they included procedures that will allow drivers to petition for
employment status with the cab companies, which would offer them the protections
under state and federal labor laws. Previously, most cab drivers were considered
independent contractors. These actions follow other reform legislation: the
addition of 300 new taxis to the fleet of 981 as of spring 1999; the creation of a
voter approved new Taxi Commission as of March 1, 1999 to oversee the industry;
and a hike in cab fares in the city. "The entire package is intended to make it easier
to find a cab in San Francisco, while at the same time, allowing drivers to make a
living and cab companies to turn a profit " id.
2 Arguably, the seeds for the "deregulation movement" were first
planted in the Transportation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, 72 Stat. 568,
implementing several recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Committee,
the chief objective of which was to "increase reliance on competitive forces of
transportation in rate making." Harris, Introduction, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
20 (1962) (prepared prior to President's Message to Congress Discussing an
Efficient Transportation System, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4148 (Apr. 5,
1962), which made substantive recommendations for amending the Interstate
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Our citizenry takes for granted the consumer benefits of
deregulated businesses. For example, it would be inconceivable
for a computer manufacturer today to petition a legislature to pass a
law forbidding any other manufacturer to enter the industry unless
it could show it would not have an impact on existing
manufacturers. Imagine the sympathy for a Microsoft petitioning
the government to keep out any competitor who might "adversely
affect" Microsoft's profits, or "steal" its customers. The public
recognizes that any competition adversely affects incumbents-that
is the nature of competition. If such a standard had been imposed
on the telecommunications business, (once thought to be a "natural
monopoly" justifying entry and price regulation) there would be no
baby bells. There would be no MCI, no Sprint, no U.S. West, no
competition of the kind that has made the American
telecommunications industry the most efficient, the most
Commerce Act.) However, what little deregulation philosophy was expressed in
that Act was not translated into substantial airfare carrier relief. The year 1976
is perhaps a more appropriate year to begin the "age of deregulation," as this
year marked only the beginning of a reversal of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
policy in initiating administrative de facto deregulation, but it was also the year
of passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45,
49 U.S.C.) (4R Act), which with the later Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-448, Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.),
began the legislative process of deregulation in the railroad industry. The
passage of these acts, along with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45, 49
U.S.C.), led Professor P.S. Dempsey to observe that "the five year period from
1976 to 1981 will be remembered as perhaps the most active in the almost one
hundred year history of governmental regulation of transportation." Dempsey,
CongressionalInterest and Agency Discretion-Neverthe Twain Shall Meet: The
Motor CarrierAct of 1980, 58 CHi.[-]KENT L. REV. 1, 11 (1981). See Robert
Hardaway, Transportation, Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
TRANS. L.J. 1, at 102 n.1 (1985). See e.g. The Better Business Bureau in
Pittsburgh (where entry was regulated) reported that in 1997, limousine
complaints ranked 30 th out of approximately 400 types of businesses tracked.
Keep Special Events Special: Check out Limo Service Before Hiring, BETTER
Bus. BUREAU, ALERT (April 8, 1998) <http://www.bbb.org/alerts/limo.html>.
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affordable, and the most profitable in the world. The public also
recognizes the difference between safety and health regulation,
which is designed to protect public health and safety, and economic
regulation which is brazenly enforced for the announced purpose of
eliminating competition and fostering monopolies. Indeed, the
trend today is to promote competition and to break up monopolies,
not to foster them. 3
It is cause for concern when governments take no action to
break up monopolies that use their economic power to shield
themselves from competition and earn monopoly profits at the
expense of public. It is inconceivable, however, that governments
would actively create and protect such monopolies even in the face
4
of overwhelming evidence of the need for additional services.
There are few available economic studies on limousine
regulation. The reason for this sparsity of studies may be due to
the fact that so few cities actually attempt to limit entry in the
limousine business that it had not yet been perceived as a national
problem. (See Appendix A, Entry Regulation). Nevertheless, in
the few cities where monopolistic
exclusionary
policies have been
•
5
enforced, the problem is indeed severe.
3 See Support HR 523, THE LIMOSCENE NEWSLETTER

(March/April

1999). The Limousine Industry Coalition to Protect Interstate Commerce Rights
expresses outrage at the former ICC rules and now at the Federal Highway
Authority's actions that can result in fines and seizure of limousines for crossing
state lines. The limousine industry coalition is forming a broader coalition to
protect free trade and interstate commerce rights. id.
4 Tom Mazza, "Las Vegas Independent Operators Fightfor Economic

Freedom", (Feb. 18, 1998) note 3. (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
5 In New York City, for example, the number of medallion cabs is
limited to approximately 1.7 vehicles per 1,000 residents. An average four-mile
fare in a licensed New York City cab costs approximately $5.70.
In
Washington, D.C., where there is unrestricted market entry and approximately
13 taxicabs per 1,000 residents, the average four-mile fare costs approximately
$3.30. See John C. Weicher, Private Innovations in Public Transit, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUB. POL. RESE., Washington D.C. at 73 (1988).
See also, The Taxi Industry and Its Reg. in Canada, ECON. COUNS. OF CANADA,

at 5 (March 1982). This study, while commenting on the economic effects of
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There are available, however, a number of studies which
have been conducted on taxicab regulation. Those studies that
have been funded by disinterested agencies responsible for the
general public welfare, such as the Federal Trade Commission,
have universally condemned the monopolistic policy of those
jurisdictions that have restricted entry. The most comprehensive of
these studies, the Bureau of Economics Staff Report of the Federal
Trade Commission, concluded: "There is virtually unanimous
agreement among economists that existing combinations of
restrictionsinto the taxi market, minimum fares, and ride sharing
are inefficient and6 the source of significant welfare loss, including
consumer injury."
The taxicab industry can be divided into four distinct
economic entities: 1) cruising cabs, 2) taxicab stands, 3) radiodispatched cabs, and 4) contract services. The taxicab studies,
which relate to the latter entity are considered relevant to the
limousine industry, and will be incorporated in to the limousine
study that follows.
A survey of industries that have deregulated, suggests that
many advantages are transferable to the limousine industry. This
study postulates that entry deregulation of the limousine industry
would achieve both economic advantages and consumer benefits;
and is suggested in conjunction with an increase in health and
safety regulation.7
regulation on the taxicab industry in general, concluded that by 1987, in
Metropolitan Toronto
specifically, taxicab regulation of both supply and price, had resulted in a price
for service approximately 25% higher than if the market was unregulated.
6 An Economic analysis of Taxicab Regulation, Bureau of Economics
Staff Report, F.T.C. at 99 (1984).
It is important not to confuse economic with social regulation. For
example, child labor laws, food and drug laws, and FAA safety regulations are
remedial and social in purpose, and have only an indirect effect on resource
allocations. The need for social regulation, i.e. health and safety regulation,
increases with entry deregulation. Following each airline accident that has
occurred since deregulation, particularly accidents of new carriers and low-cost
carriers, there is public discussion about the reluctance of and the need for safety
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The study herein is divided into the following sections:
Part II reviews the history of regulation and deregulation of the
transportation industry in the United States and focuses on
common denominators which the limousine industry shares with
other sectors of the transportation industry, such as airlines,
trucking, railroads, and taxicabs; Part II analyzes the history of
economic regulation on the limousine industry and evaluates its
competitive characteristics; Part IV collects the available data
about the limousine industry and creates an economic model which
can be used to plot the effects of regulation; Part V analyzes the
various rationales which have been set forth for entry and price
regulation in the limousine industry and evaluates them according
to accepted principles of economics. Part VI sets forth the proof
that the rationales for economic regulation do not survive the
scrutiny of applying generally accepted economic principles. Part
VII This section concludes that economic regulation does
inestimable harm to the consumer and the public.
It also
concludes, however, that there is ample, indeed compelling
justification for non-economic regulation such as stringent health
and safety regulation. The study that follows reveals that entry
regulation in the limousine industry, as in the taxi industry, causes
significant welfare loss to incumbent firms, potential competitors,
employees, and most particularly to the consumer.
II.

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AIRLINES, RAILROADS, AND TRUCKING

A. History of Regulation
Regulation of taxicabs and limousines is the last great
bulwark of government transportation regulation to survive during
the past three decades of deregulation in the airline, trucking, and
railroad industries. This period of transportation deregulation
began in the 1962 when John F. Kennedy, in his Transportation
regulators to take action.
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Message to Congress called for "reliance on the forces
of
8
competition and less reliance on the restraints of regulation"
The history of economic regulation reveals a now familiar
pattern: a failure to learn from previous mistakes, attempts to
protect powerful incumbent enterprises from competition
regardless of the needs of the consumer, and schemes to use the
power of government to create cartels and discipline cartel
members in order to maintain monopolies. Such schemes are
based on an age-old ideology that has as its basic premise that
economic laws can be made to disappear if they are only ordered to
do so. It has been thousands of years since the first attempts by
civilized society to regulate economic activity by the use of
government power.9 Tenets of this ideology include belief that
printing more money, that real prices can be raised or lowered, and
supply lowered or increased by the waving of a regulatory wand,
and that an efficient industry can be mandated by government fiat,
can create wealth. The result of this regulatory ideology has
caused human tragedy and misery of unparalleled proportions. For
example, stringent rent controls in France from 1914 to 1918
10
resulted in an almost complete cessation of residential building.
8

A.

FRIEDLAENDER,

THE

DILEMMA

OF

FREIGHT

TRANSPORT

REGULATION vii (1969). In particular, the following inefficiencies and inequities
(of regulation) were singled out [by President Kennedy]: the dulling of

managerial initiative; the inability of carriers to divest themselves of traffic that
fails to cover costs; . . . the substitution of cost-increasing service competition
for cost-reducing rate competition; . . . and, finally, the decline of the common

carrier relative to private and exempt carriage.
9 Hardaway, supra note 2, at 107. By 301 A.D., economic regulation
was well established as an instrument of state power. In that year the Emperor
Diolectian issued his famous edict threatening death for violations of laws setting
a "just price." H. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OFECONOMIC THOUGHT 63 (1983). By
1359, private companies had obtained monopoly powers by charter from their
respective governments. In that year, the society of Merchant Adventurers
obtained a charter, and benefits of regulation; in 1600, the East India Company
received its charter. Both attempted to suppress the competition, whom they
called "free-traders" and "interlopers." Id. at 99.
10SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 372 (1970).
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(It was only after the lifting of rent control after World War HI that
there was a rigorous boom in French residential building). New
York City rent controls continue to result in the tragic
abandonment of apartments at a time when shelter is desperately
needed." I More recently, in the 1970's, federal ceilings on natural
gas prices caused severe shortages
• 12and curtailment of vitally
Whenever governments
needed operations and explorations.
continue to impose their draconian regulatory regimes, black
markets thrive and tragic shortages occur.
Large industries have traditionally relied upon the power of
government to maintain monopolies and cartels. In the 1890's,
powerful railroad interests, exasperated with cartel members who
offered discounts to consumers, secured the passage of legislation
which used the power of government to impose a railroad cartel
which restricted entry and imposed monopoly fares.' 3 In 1938, the
11"The 'war power' includes power to remedy evils which have arisen
from the conflict and continues for the duration of that emergency, and does not
necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
92 L.Ed. 596 (1948) (post war rent control).
12The natural gas story also is well known. Federal ceilings on natural
gas producer prices resulted in an imbalance between supply and demand. For
years, natural gas was consumed more rapidly than new supplies could be
obtained. The result was a reduction of supply to the point where neither peak
nor annual demands for gas could be met. Industries dependent on gas supplies
were curtailed in their operations and were shut down completely for limited
periods. Residential consumers of gas were not far removed from interruptions
in supply that could work major hardships. Natural gas users, deprived of
supplies, imposed additional demands on their energy sources, aggravating
energy problems elsewhere. Again public and industry dissatisfaction led to a
legislative program of deregulation. (footnotes omitted). Jones, Government
Price Controls and Inflation: A Prognosis Based on the Impact of Controls in
the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L.REV. 303, 318 (1980).
13 Freindlaender, supra note 8, at 2 (citing the following works

supporting the view of railroad support of regulation: S. Buck, The Granger
Movement, 1870-1880 (1913); L. Benson, Merchants, Farmers and Railroads:
Railroad Regulation and New York Politics 1850-1887 (1955); I. Tarbell, The
History of The Standard Oil Company (1904)). There were a few Railroad men
who did not welcome the 1887 Act: John Murray Forbes and William Bliss. See
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airline industry succeeded in persuading Congress to create an
airline cartel that blocked entry to competitors and set prices. For
the next forty years the Civil Aeronautics Board wielded its power
with a draconian hand: it did not permit a single competitor to
enter the industry during its iron-fisted reign. As Professor
Dempsey has observed "(T) he excessively rigid regulatory scheme
established by the (CAB) ...between 1938 and 1975 allowed the
creation of4 an effective oligopoly composed of the five major trunk
carriers."'
It was only after the 1975 Kennedy Hearings in Congress
revealed that regulated fares were 84% higher than what
competitive rates would be that an enraged American public
demanded deregulation of the airline industry.' 5 In the aftermath
letter from John Murray Forbes to John M. Endicott (Jan. 29, 1887); Letter from
William Bliss to Chauncey Depew (Jan. 20, 1887), quoted in G. KULKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATIONS 7, 45 (1970). For the most part, however, the
Railroads openly welcomed regulation as Kulko has observed. Id. at 5, 6.
The crucial point is that the railroads, for the most part,
consistently accepted the basic premises of federal regulation
since only through the positive intervention of the national
political structure could the destabilizing, costly effects of
cutthroat competition predatory speculators, and greedy
shippers to overcome. Moreover, the railroads were a much
more constant force for federal regulation than the shippers,
and the deeper divisions within the ranks of shippers often
meant that their agitation for regulation contributed to the
interests of the railroads.
Legislative proposals, to be
successful, usually needed the support of both the railroads
and important shipping groups, and throughout the period from
1877 to 1916 neither could obtain legislation without the
support of the other for some general form of legislation.
Id. at 78.
14Hardaway citing Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation (19761984): Turning the Tide, 14 TRANS. L. J. 1,134 (1984).
15 Oversight of the CAB Prac. and Proc.: Hearings Before
the
Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. and Proc.of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 4 th
Cong., Ist Sess. 454 (1975) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearings] (statement of
William A. Jordan). STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94T
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of airline deregulation in 1978, airfares in real terms declined
dramatically, 16 fifteen new carriers entered the industry, 17 and
safety was enhanced from .10 fatal crashes per 100,000 takeoffs in
1978 to .08 in 1982.18 In recent years many of the benefits of
airline deregulation have been dissipated by the lack of government
antitrust action to prevent the monopolization of airport resources
and the creation of fortress hubs. Nevertheless, Americans now
enjoy the safest, most efficient, and cheapest air service in the
CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON CAB PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

41

(COMM.

PRINT 1975). See also, Snow:
The present system of airline regulation is seriously deficient.
Its most serious deficiency is that it causes air fares to be
considerably higher than they would be otherwise. It also
results in a serious misallocation of resources, discourages
innovations in service, denies consumers the range of price
and service options which they would prefer, and creates a
chronic tendency towards excess capacity in the industry. The
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has historically used its broad
powers to forbid competitive pricing and lower fares. Unable
to compete on the basis of price, carriers have been forced into
costly service competition, and the costs of these services have
been passed on to the consumer. On review of the evidence,
one is forced to conclude that the present regulatory system is
hindering, not advancing, the original statutory objectives of
"adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges."
The present regulatory system has
become a major obstacle to the provision of air service at the
lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service.
Ironically, airline profit levels are not increased by this
regulatory system, and they may indeed be made more volatile
than otherwise.
Snow, The Problem of Airline Regulation and the FordAdministration Proposal
for Reform, in REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG
AIRLINES 3 (P. MacAvoy & J. Snow eds. 1977).
16 Hearings, supra note 15 at 10.
17 Cab Report, supra note 15 at 12.
18 Air Transp. Ass'n, Annual Report of the U.S. Scheduled Airline
Industry 6 (1983), Wall St. J., Oct. 18,1983 at 35.
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world compared to those in other parts of the world who must
endure the high fairs and poor service of regulated airlines.
It has taken the most popular revolt in American history to
overcome the powerful economic interests which imposed
transportation regulation on airlines, trucking, and railroads during
the early and mid years of the twentieth century. Deregulation has
enabled our economy to become the most productive in the world.
Our example has begun to lead to deregulation in other countries as
well, as communism collapsed, and popular revolts have led to the
overturning of regulation in developed nations. Aside from the
resistance of entrenched and powerful enterprises who seek to use
government to limit entry and competition and impose monopoly
prices by government fiat, the greatest obstacle to deregulation has
been the regulatory establishment itself.
As with the
disillusionment with communism, the slow realization that
competition and the market provide the public with the most
efficient and safe service and lowest prices in the transportation
industry has caused considerable disillusionment among regulators
who have a vested interest in regulation itself. 19 As a former
Hardaway, supra note 2 at 1104. Regulatory legislation is the end
product of a political process, which is sensitive to large power blocs and
groups. See Olson & Trapani, Who Has Benefited From Regulation of the
Airline Industry, 24 J.L. & ECON. 75 (1981). Jordan's study of both the
regulated and unregulated airline industry in California revealed that regulations
resulted in excess capacity and thus benefited airplane manufacturers, employees
and suppliers. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 226-38 (1970),
19

noted in Olson & Trapani. Id. at 75. For a discussion of union political
incentives, and the effects of union power on regulation, see Hendricks, Fehille
& Szerszen, Regulation, Deregulation,and Collective Bargainingin Airlines, 34

INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67 (1980).
regulation as follows:

Stigler analyzes political power and

When an industry receives a grant of power from the state, the
benefit to the industry will fall short of the damage to the rest
of the community. Even if there were no deadweight losses
from acquired regulation, however, one might expect a
democratic society to reject such industry requests unless the

330

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 21

general counsel of the CAB lamented shortly after the dismantling
of the government's regulation empire, "it is understandably
painful for one involved in economic regulation over a professional
lifetime to 20consider his life's work outdated, or even worse
misdirected.
industry controlled a majority of the votes. Because the ethical
decision is coercive, the decision process is fundamentally
different from that of the market. If the public is asked to
make a decision between two transportation means comparable
to the individual's decision on how to travel-say, whether
airlines or railroads should receive a federal subsidy-the
decision must be abided by everyone, travelers and nontravelers, travelers this year and travelers next year.... The
industry which seeks political power must go to the
appropriate seller, the political party. The political party has
costs of operation, costs of maintaining an organization and
competing in elections. These costs of the political process are
viewed excessively narrowly in the literature on the financing
of elections: elections are to the political process what
merchandising is to the process of producing a commodity,
The party maintains its
only an essential final step.
organization and electoral appeal by the performance of costly
services to the voter at all times, not just before elections. All
of the costs of services and organization are borne by putting a
party of the party's workers on the public payroll. An
opposition party however, is usually essential insurance for the
voters to discipline a party in power, and the opposition
party's costs are not fully met by public funds.
The industry which seeks regulation must be prepared
to do so with the two things a party needs: votes and resources.
Stigler, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, 2 BELL. J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 10-12 (1971).
20

Edles, The Strategy of Regulatory Change, 49 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 626,

628 (1982). See also Levine:
This pattern emerges frequently enough to inspire speculation
about the "true" sources of regulation and about the "true"
motives of regulators. While no single explanation gained
unanimous acceptance, a kind of "cluster consensus" appeared.
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III.
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
TAXICABS AND LIMOUSINES

REGULATION

OF

Limousines remain as the last relic of transportation
regulation in America.
For the most part, taxicabs were
unregulated until the 1930's, when car prices and wages tumbled.
Competition became severe for established taxicab companies who
now had to compete with unemployed workers who realized that
the low capitalization and easy entry of taxicab driving could
subsidize their livelihood. The introduction of regulations in the
taxicab business was not stimulated by the public interest, but by
limited self-interest. Pressure came from the American Transit
Association, public transit firms, established taxi fleets and the
National Association of Taxicab Owners (which passed22 a
resolution favoring entry and minimum fare controls).
Historically, an estimated 43 out of 93 U.S. cities with a population
of over 100,000 had restricted entry into the taxi business by
This consensus characterized regulation as a device used by
relatively small subgroups of the general population, either
private corporations or geographic or occupational groups, to
produce results favorable to them, which would not be
produced by the market. The regulatory services provided
were variously described as organization of a cartel, wealth
transfers as form of "taxation," enshrinement of capitalistic
class interests, or preservation of congressional and
bureaucratic power. Of course, all gains, whether from
regulation or the market, are in a sense realized by private
human beings. The operational significance of this view of
regulation is that government processes are used by organized
subgroups of the .population to enforce inefficient
arrangements that transfer wealth or power to them.
Michael Levine, Revisions Revised: Airline Deregulation and the Public
Interest, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBS, Winter, 1981, at 179, n. 2.
21 Putting Customers First: Taxicab Reform in the Greater
Toronto Area <http://www.nextcity.com/cpi/taxilhtm>.
22 An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation, supra note 6.
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1934. 23 Just as the airline industry cycled through regulation to
deregulation, the last bastion of the taxi industry has yet to
deregulate.
Experiences in taxicab deregulation show that cities with
open entry have more than three times the number of cabs per
capita than regulated cities. 24 In Toronto, Canada, there is an open
market for resale of plates, effectively benefiting owners who
purchase their plate from the commission, while exposing those
purchasing plates on the open market to uncapped risk.2 5 "Based
on a $4,500 license fee and a current open market value of
$85,000, a taxicab owner who purchases a plate from the
commission has a no-risk opportunity to realize a 1,800 per cent
return on his asset if he sells the plate at market value after an
obligatory three-year holding period. The owner who purchases
that same plate on the open market, assumes all the risk since
control of the market and ownership of the plate rests exclusively
in the hands of the Metropolitan Licensing Commission. ' 26 In the
U.S., Nevada• presents an example of27rigid entry regulation. The
applicable Nevada regulatory statutes make little or no pretense
of regulating for the purpose of protecting the public, insuring
adequate service, or fostering efficiency or competition. Rather,
Nevada Revised Statute Para. 706.391 (2)(c) clearly and
forthrightly states the underlying rationale and standard of
Nevada's regulation-- namely, the exclusion of any competitor who
cannot show that it "will not unreasonably and adversely affect
28
other carriers in the territory for which the certificate is sought."
In other words, a firm is only afforded the privilege of competing
in the industry if it can prove that it would be so inefficient that it
could not compete effectively with the incumbent firms. In this
23
24

Putting Customers First, supra note 21
John C. Weicher, Private Innovations in Public Transit, AMERICAN

ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH,
25

Putting Customers First, supra note 2 1.
26

73 (1988).

Id.

27

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 706.391(2)(c), 706.036; 706.041; 706.386 (1999).
28

Id.
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respect, the Nevada statute differs from other regulatory schemes
which at least incorporate fig leaf provisions which purport to
regulate for the public good.
Even the showing of an urgent need for additional services
is insufficient to earn a certificate of public convenience under this
restrictive regulatory scheme. For example, there are only seven
licensed limousine and taxi companies in Las Vegas, Nevada,
serving over 30 million visitors a year. By way of comparison,
there are 274 limousine companies serving approximately the same
number of visitors in Los Angeles. 29 Each limousine operator in
Orlando serves 300,000 visitors; each operator in Los Angeles
serves 109,000 visitors. In Las
Vegas, each operator serves a
30
visitors.
million
5.3
staggering
These Las Vegas operators, each of whom serves a
customer base of over 50 times that of other major cities,
nevertheless object strenuously, and apparently with no sense of
irony, when even one competitor dares to seek a certificate of
convenience to operate even one limousine in southern Nevada.
Indeed, the threat of even a single competitor is deemed so great
that incumbents supported and fostered legislation that created
virtually impassable barriers to entry.3 1 As a result, some
applicants have expended over half a million dollars in application
fees and expenses, and generated hundreds of pages of transcripts
and documents, only to be denied a certificate. Incumbents are
even allowed to "intervene" in the process and object to that
application on grounds that it might lead to price or service
competition, or even that it might chip away at the incumbents'
protected oligopoly profits.
As in the case of airline, trucking and railroad deregulation,
however, a popular revolt is beginning to turn the tide in the battle
against taxicab and limousine regulation and government-imposed

29 Tom

Mazza, supra note 4.

30 Id.
31 Mildner,

supra note 1.
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32

cartels. Taxi and limousine customers are becoming increasingly
concerned about dirty and unsafe cabs, slow and inefficient service
and high fares. 3 3 An example of such a popular revolt can be
found in the experience of deregulation of taxicabs in Indianapolis.
Before deregulation of taxicabs in that city, the Indianapolis News
revealed that "the cost of renting a 35 foot limousine, complete
with TV and VCR, to or from the Indianapolis airport, is about half
the price of a taxicab on the same route." In other words, the
people finally began to realize that the service and price of a
limousine in the unregulated market was better and cheaper than
the filthy taxicabs provided by a heavily regulated industry. The
News went on to document the "disappointing experiences with
local cab companies-from dirty, ill-maintained vehicles to late
32

Different states are in various stages of regulation and deregulation.

Pennsylvania is an another example of recent deregulation of the limousine
industry. Owners of three limousine companies interviewed all commented on
the significant changes taking place in the industry. One of the biggest potential
changes is a proposal in Pennsylvania to ease the entry rules for companies new
to the limousine business, see e.g. David Perlis, Limousine Firms Say Business
Growing, CENT. PENN. Bus. J. 27 September 18, 1998, available in
WL 11918874: "There is continuing demand and growth in the business segment
of the limousine-service industry, particularly for airport service .. .I don't
know that the total number of limousine services has increased, but the industry
in general continues to show growth both statewide and nationally."
33 To address this, the general manager of Hartsfield Atlanta
International Airport assigned a task force of limousine operators and law
enforcement officers to identify ways to improve limousine operations at this
airport. Contributing to the creation of the task force were jammed roadways,
illegal operators and confusing pickup locations. The operators comment that
the most pressing problem is the number of illegal operators who do not have
permits. Shade Elam, DeCosta Aims for Smoother Limo Service, ATLANTA
Bus. CHRON. A3 OCTOBER 30, 1998, available in WL 21960902. Equally
concerned are limousine operators in Pennsylvania. They fear that the plan to
relax entry rules will mean that anyone can get into the limousine business.
Their concern is that unreliable companies may transport people in unsafe cars.
See also Limo Operators Defend Start-up Rules, Premium News, International
Taxi and Livery Association (December 1998) (established limousine operators
arguing against deregulation).
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arrivals. Even Mayor Goldsmith had to wait two hours for a cab to
arrive."
In a declaration of independence from the tyranny of
regulation, outraged
Indianapolis residents finally threw the regulators out in the
summer of 1995, outlawing government price fixing of taxi fares
and entry restrictions. 34 This action came on the heels of a United
States Transportation study which concluded that "deregulating
the cab industry would save consumers $800 million and create
38,000 new jobs. "
Ironically, regulation harms taxicab drivers even more than
it harms consumers. In 1994, the Cincinnati Enquirer exposed a
city conspiracy to exclude small entrepreneurs from the taxicab
business in the form of a "moratorium" on granting new licenses.
As a result, licenses, which had previously been issued for $161,
were being "scalped" on the street for $3,000 to $6,000, much in
the way New York City taxi medallions create a market for the
right to extract monopoly profits from consumers. After paying
expenses, few cab drivers were able to earn a decent living after
being gouged for such fees. In New York, the typical driver can't
even afford to buy a medallion, and is reduced to working for
wealthy investors who can afford hundreds of thousands of dollars
35
for a medallion.
Despite deregulation, yellow-cab retained its sizable market share.
New players, some owning just two or three cabs, instantly flooded the market
upon entry deregulation. Initially, several drivers bought their own cars, but in
time, several went back to being employed by established companies. By 1998,
Indianapolis transportation industry faced consolidation. National operators
acquired three major Indianapolis companies with local operations. "Earlier
distinctions separating limousine services from buses and taxicab services are
beginning to blur as the players invade each other's businesses. These changes
spark a new energy in the market that should be good for consumers." Katie
Culbertson, City's Cab King Sold to Texas Firm, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. 1 March
16, 1998 35
availablein WL 9784475.
The New York municipal code allows that
34

[t]he city of New York may, by local law authorize the New
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LIMOUSINE

The first step in creating an economic model for limousine
regulation is to identify those characteristics of the limousine
business which would determine its place on the Pure
Competition'Natural Monopoly Continuum. Where an industry
falls on this continuum determines the extent to which economic
regulation can be justified on grounds of economic efficiency and
fundamental fairness. Economists find little justification for
regulation of industries which are competitive.
Conversely,
economists acknowledge the need for some regulation of a "natural
monopoly" where significant capital barriers to entry result in the
creation of firms which are so large, and command such a high
percentage of the total market that the large firms can affect price
by expanding or withholding output. 36 A firm which can affect the
York city taxi and limousine commission or its successor
agency to issue additional taxicab licenses, provided, however,
that the number of such additional licenses issued shall not
exceed four hundred, and provided further that such additional
licenses shall be issued by public sale and shall be fully
transferable. Such local law shall also provide that such
commission or successor thereto shall prescribe by regulation
the procedures for the issuance and public sale of such
additional licenses, by public auction, sealed bids or other
competitive process.
McKinney's General Municipal Law §§ 181,

MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATATED
LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW CHAPTER 24 OF THE
CONSOLIDATED LAWS ARTICLE 9-REGUALTION OF USE OF BICYCLES AND SIMILAR
VEHICLES §§181 ADDED L. 1956, C. 209, §§1, EFF. APRIL 2, 1956; AMENDED L.

1992, C. 829, §§1; L. 1993, C. 579, §§1.
36 For instance, Areeda & Turner refer to a competitive industry as one
where each firm has too small a market share to affect market price. They claim
that this is unlike the airline industry where market prices vary dramatically in
response to the actions of individual carriers. Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
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market price of a product by reducing output will maximize profit
at a price higher than would be set by a free market. Where this
occurs, regulation to protect the consumer from monopoly prices
may be justified.37
It should be noted, however, that the definition of a "natural
monopoly" has changed considerably over the past ten to twenty
years. For example, the telephone industry was once considered
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975). Since deregulation, there are
still claims that the actions of individual carriers can determine market prices.
For example, Continental Airlines sued American Airline's parent company for
monopolistic pricing. Continental Airlines v. Amer. Airlines, Inc., Civ.A.Nos.
G-92-259, G-92-266, 1999 WL 3793396, (S.D.Tex). August 10, 1993). Here,
Continental alleged that an American pricing plan was a scheme that guaranteed
large losses to both American and its competitors such that American, as the
largest carrier in the United States, would be able to drive its competitors from
the market. Thereafter, American would be able to increase the price and
recover its profits. Id. at 693.
37 Samualson, supra note 10 at 577.
38 Economists generally define "natural monopoly" as one where
economies of scale are so great that only a single producer is viable in the
industry. By the same reasoning, a "natural oligopoly" is where economies of
scale are so great that only a limited number of producers are viable in the
industry. The capital requirements of economies of scale are usually high,
creating a "natural" barrier to entry. Thus, it is important to determine the
barriers of entry to a particular industry before choosing a regulatory model. In
theory, where barriers to entry are sufficiently high to result in the creation of a
natural monopoly or oligopoly, some regulation may be necessary to neutralize
the oligopoly power. Likewise, where barriers to entry are not so high and
where many producers may therefore enter an industry, regulation becomes selfdefeating, especially if regulation takes the form of limiting entry. In fact,
regulation under these circumstances actually creates barriers where none existed
before, taking the place of "natural" barriers. This is exactly what happened
with airline regulation: artificial barriers to entry were created, thus actually
creating an "artificial oligopoly." The airline industry is a classic example of
such an artificially created oligopoly. When airline regulation began in 1938,
there were 16 carriers, which gradually evolved into 10 domestic trunk lines. No
new trunk lines were permitted entry prior to 1978. HARVARD PROJECT, supra
note 3, at 5. The tragedy of this heavy-handed regulation was that such an
oligopoly was totally unnecessary because of the relatively low economies of
scale and barriers to entry in the industry.
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to be a prime example of a "natural monopoly" since there were
great economies of scale in laying telephone wires, and it was
thought that competition would be wasteful for competitors to lay
competing telephone networks. 39 For this reason the telephone
company was granted legal monopoly status, and regulated
accordingly. Likewise, the electric power industry was considered
to be a natural monopoly, and also regulated accordingly. In recent
years, however, it has been recognized that the "natural monopoly"
rationale for regulation even in these capital-intensive industries
can not be justified. As a result new firms have been allowed to
enter the telephone industry.

A. The Pure Competition! Natural Monopoly Continuum

J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATION at 300
(1976). 39
Hirshleifer defines a competitive trader as a "price taker." Id. The
terms of control facing him in the market are, in his view, outside his sphere of
control; he regards himself as able to buy or sell price." Id. at 198. There are
three additional characteristics of a perfect market: 1) Perfect communication, 2)
instantaneous equilibrium, and 3) costless transactions. Id. at 200, 201.
Obviously such characteristics occur in theory only. Another important
characteristic of perfect competition is that entry into the market be "absolutely
free in the long run." P. Samuelson, supra note 10, at 448.
Samuelson shows that the long-run break-even condition:
comes at a critical P[rice] where the identical firms just cover
their full competitive costs. At lower long-run P [rice], firms
would leave the industry, until P [rice] had returned to the
critical equilibrium level; at higher long-run P[rice], new firms
would enter the industry replicating what existing firms are
doing and thereby forcing market price back down to the longrun equilibrium P[rice] where all competitive costs are just
covered...

P[rice]

competitive costs.

=

MC

(Marginal

cost)

-

minimum

Taxis and Limousines
Pure Competition-------------------------- NaturalMonopoly
Characteristics:

Characteristics:

1. No significant economies of scale

1.
Significant
economies of scale

2. Relatively undifferentiatedproduct

2.
Differentiated
product

3. Low natural barriersto entry

3.
High
natural
barriersto entry

4. No declining costs

4. Declining Costs

The point where the limousine business

falls on this

continuum, in the absence of economic regulation, depends upon
whether it has characteristics which more approximate those of

pure competition or natural monopoly. In general, considerations
of economic efficiency and fundamental fairness justify economic

regulation only of those industries which fall on the far right of the
continuum.

This is because in cases where a monopoly naturally

exists, the public needs to be protected from the power of the
monopolist to raise prices above marginal costs and to reduce
output below what would be demanded at a fair market price.

40

40 Hardaway, supra note 2 at 120, 121, n. 97: Samuelson explains that if

an industry is to be regulated in order to wipe out its "excess profits," regulators
should force the price to where it equals average cost [AC], "and price covers
only normal costs." However, Samuelson advocates that: "Ideally, P[rice]
should be forced all the way down to MC [marginal cost]...." Id. The latter
solution, however, usually requires a government subsidy since "with a
decreasing cost situation.. .setting P=MC while AC is still falling will involve
[t]he firm in a chronic loss." Id. In summary: Monopolistic deviation from P =
MC means "exploitation" of labor (and other transferable resources), in the sense
that society's labor is misapplied as between goods and leisure or as between
too-scarce monopolized goods in relation to too-plentiful competitive goods. Id.
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Government regulation of purely competitive industries, however,
will cause economic distortions, inefficiency, and injury to the
41
public and to the consumer.
To determine where the limousine industry falls on the
continuum requires an analysis of each of the four characteristics
of the model with respect to the limousine industry. Such analysis
follows.
1. Economies of Scale
Economies of scale are relatively low in the limousine
business. An entrepreneur can enter the business by the purchase
or lease of a limousine. Financing of a vehicle is generally
available to any creditworthy entrepreneur with a good driving
safety record. Additional costs, such as the costs of buying a
yellow pages advertisements, the cost of a telephone or answering
at 480.
The problem, of course, is that economics is at best an inexact
science, and even the best intentioned regulators can not hope
to fathom the various costs, marginal costs, and average costs
of an industry, and even if they could, estimates of "a proper"
rate of return carried out to one or two decimal places are
unlikely to be worth the effort expended.
The standard to which such efforts implicitly appeal is that of
overcoming "distortions" produced by competitive market
failure-the standard of trying to replicate what would occur
without such a failure. Yet in trying to overcome such failures
the regulatory process introduces so many distortions of its
own, that one should be satisfied with gross estimates and not
insist upon refined economic calculations. Second, insofar as
cost-of-service ratemaking is advocated as a "cure" for market
failure, one must believe that the unregulated market is
functioning quite badly to warrant the introduction of classical
regulation.
S.

BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
41

Id.

at 59 (1982).
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service, and a driver's or chauffeur's license, are generally modest.
42
In its Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation , the Federal
Trade Commission concluded: "There appearto be no important
economies of scale in the case of markets for cruising taxis and
markets where taxis wait at stands for customers to arrive." It
cites R.D.Echert for the conclusion that "small taxi companies can
compete with fleets provided cruising is profitable or legal access
to open stands is inexpensive relative to the gain. 43
The FTC Report does acknowledge that there may some
economies of scale in taxicab radio-dispatch operations. This is
because a large firm can divide the cost of radio-dispatch among
many drivers. For this reason, some small limousine operators
may have higher dispatch costs. Thus the capital costs of creating
a large radio-dispatch network may constitute a modest economic
barrier to small entrants. In the limousine industry, however, the
cost of radio-dispatch as a percentage of total costs is smaller than
in the taxicab industry. This may be due to the fact that much of
the limousine business is done through contract rather than by
radio-dispatch-of the type that is common in the taxi business.
According to a nationwide survey, limousine operators with more
that 20 vehicles earned 43% of their 1998 annual revenue from
corporate work that is typically contracted. 44 Contracts from
network affiliations provide additional limousine revenue source.
42

Bureau of Economics Staff Report, supra note 6 at 53.

43 Echert, R.D., The Los Angeles Taxi Monopoly: An Economic Inquiry,

SOUTHERN CALiFORNtA LAW REvIEw, 43(2) 1970, at 431.
" Mark Becker, Statistics: Revenues Increase; New Playersforge Onto

the Scene, Bobit Publishing Co. 1999 <http:www.limousinecentral.com>.
"According to operators surveyed nationwide, with one to 20 vehicles, 23% of
their annual revenue came from weddings and 23% came from airport work-the
top revenue sources for small operators in 1999. Operators with one to 20
vehicles also reported significant revenue from corporate work as 22% of their
annual revenue came from this profit center." Id. Small operators reported
proms, casino work, graduations, and sporting event as other revenue sources.
Larger operators (over 20 limousines) reported proms, shuttle contracts, tour and
charter, and restaurant management as other revenue sources. Id.
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Over half of all limousine operators surveyed indicated that they
obtain 25% of their gross revenue from network association
contracts.4 5 Finally, average maintenance costs are approximately
whether the operator has a fleet of
$200 per month per vehicle,
46
vehicles.
20
over
or
under
In summary, overall economies of scale in the limousine
business appear to be extremely low in comparison to other
unregulated industries in the economy. This factor therefore
contributes to a leftward bias in the limousine industry toward the
pure competition model on the continuum.
2. Differentiated Product
A primary component of the Pure Competition Model is an
undifferentiated product. An undifferentiated product insures that
"buyers do not care from which any one seller they purchase the
goods, so long as the price is the same."47
The classic example of an undifferentiated product is salt.
45 ld.
46

id. See also, David Perlis:

Central Pennsylvania business routinely rent limos to commute
to airports; business meetings, corporate luncheons and dinner
meetings; and for a wide variety of other business related
functions, according to the owners and operators of regional
Futher, they state that corporate
limousine services.
transportation is an important facet of the limousine service
industry, by providing a good base to other work. The
business clientele, if not contracted, tends to be the return
customer. There is continuing demand and growth in the
business segment of the industry, particularly with respect to
airport services.
David Perlis, Limousine Firms say Business Growing, CENT. PENN. BUS. J.,
September 18, 1998 at 32, available in WL 11918874.
47 Edwin Mansfield, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS,
(2d. Ed. W.W. Norton) at 556.
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Although a particular manufacturer of salt may attempt to create an
illusion of a differentiated product by advertising and marketing,
most consumers recognize salt as an undifferentiated product, and
will buy salt on the basis of price alone.
Airline travel was once thought to be highly differentiated.
A further look into aviation history, both in terms of service
amenities and safety proves this was erroneous. During the period
of airline regulation (1938-1978), the bureaucrats on the Civil
Aeronautics Board argued that economic regulation of airlines was
justified in part by the fact that airlines could compete by quality of
service even as they were forbidden to compete on price. Airlines
did indeed attempt to differentiate their product, engaging in the
now infamous "liquor wars", in which each airline competed by
seeing who could offer the most free liquor or cigarettes. Some
airlines were so desperate to find a way to compete under
regulation that they offered such amenities a "Polynesian Pubs",
and other extravagances. When these extravagances increased
costs, no airline had anything to fear from a competitor who cut
costs rather than increasing them, since no competitor was allowed
to offer a lower fare. As costs rose, the airlines simply petitioned
the CAB for a rate hike to cover these costs. When rate hikes were
granted, each airline was forced to charge the higher fares. Not
surprisingly, the cost of air travel soared beyond the budgets of
ordinary Americans. Accustomed to today's low airfares many
tend to forget that prior to airline deregulation in 1978, most
Americans taking public transportation traveled by bus. To this
day, there are diehards who look back nostalgically to the day of
airline regulation when planes traveled half empty, customers were
plied with liquor, cigarettes, and pubs, and the Great Unwashed
were relegated to buses. What the CAB bureaucrats failed to
recognize, however, was that air service was in fact highly
undifferentiated-that is, most travelers cared less about the
amenities than they did about price.
When airlines were
deregulated in 1978, and permitted to charge lower fares, fares
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plummeted despite spiraling fuel costs. 48 Under regulation, these
spiraling fuel costs would doubtless have been used as the basis for
seeking fare hikes from the CAB. As it was, however, airlines
were forced to find ways to become more efficient in order to
survive.
There were dire predictions that airline deregulation would
cause many airlines to fail. In the aftermath of deregulation, some
firms, (such as Braniff), which could not become more efficient in
a competitive environment, did indeed fail. Others, such as United
and American, were able to adapt, and are now more profitable
than they ever were under regulation. New entrants, such as
Southwest Airlines (which would never have been permitted to
enter the industry under the exclusionary policies of airline
regulation), have not only thrived under deregulation, but have
posed such competitive pressures on the major trunks that the
trunks too have become more efficient. As a result, air travel in the
United States is now cheaper and safer than anywhere else in the
world. Belatedly, airlines around the world are now emulating the
deregulation of United States airlines in the hope that they will
become more efficient. However, this process is proceeding quite
slowly, and air travel in Europe continues to almost twice as
expensive per mile as in the United States.49
One important lessons of airline deregulation was that in
the area of transportation, the product is highly undifferentiated,
and that consumers care far more about price than any perceived
differentiation in the product. United Airlines, for example, found
that it could not use product differentiation to compete with the
new entrant, Southwest, which undercut its fares by fifty percent.
One of the first lessons learned by the major trunk carriers was that
customers find most airline seats to be remarkably similar-the
48

Hardaway, supra note 2 at 144.

49 See generally, Hardaway, The FAA

"Buy-Sell Slot Rule: Airline
Deregulation at the Crossroads." 52 JOUR. OF AIR L. AND COM. 1 (1986);
Hardaway and Dempsey, Airlines, Airports, and Antitrust: A ProposedStrategy
for Enhanced Competition, 58 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 455

(1993).

Taxis and Limousines

planes themselves were made by the same company (Boeing or
Airbus), and that seats were generally comparable in terms of leg
room. In short, the major trunk carriers found that they could not
tout their allegedly superior service and watch an upstart like
Southwest Airlines undercut it fares. 50 This is not to suggest, of
course, that service and legroom are not important. Rather, it is to
suggest that the product is relatively undifferentiated, and that price
is the more important than product differentiation. The chief nonprice factor considered by the consumer is safety. However, safety
is properly regulated by government agencies. Thus, it was not
surprising that in the aftermath of airline deregulation airline safety
increased dramatically, from .10 fatal crashes per 100,000 takeoffs
in 1978 on the eve of deregulation, to .08 fatal crashes per 100,000
takeoffs in 1982 after four years of deregulation. 5 1 Even more
important, the FAA reported that "performance indicators"
(accidents, injuries, and FAA violations) improved by thirty
percent in the aftermath of deregulation). 5 2 Such dramatic
increases in safety after deregulation have been attributed to two
factors: 1) no longer burdened with the task of telling airlines how
much to charge, where to fly, and how to run their business,
government agencies were able to concentrate their regulatory
energies on safety itself; and 2) airlines were no longer protected
from failure by a benign CAB. In forty years of CAB rule, it
refused to let any airline fail for safety reasons. Yet, following
deregulation, an airline that failed to live up to the highest safety
standards and had an accident was allowed to fail. This created
53
huge incentives to follow the highest safety practices.
Deregulated airlines in the United States continue to have far
higher safety record than the regulated foreign airlines whose
50

It is interesting to observe that Southwest Airlines, once considered

the nemesis of post deregulation start-up carriers, is now treated as a major
player-an established trunk carrier-that is often quoted and emulated by many
major airlines for its successful and longstanding management techniques.
51 See supra note 18 at 7.
52 Id.
53 Hardaway, supra note 46 at 148.
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governments' efforts are dissipated in wasteful economic
regulation.
Product differentiation in the taxicab industry is even less
of a factor than in the airline industry. Under the typically
regulated taxi business in most American cities, consumers are
rarely given the opportunity to choose between cabs of different
quality. Consumers are generally faced with a "take it or leave it"
situation. In New York, for example, one may accept a ride in a
cab with worn shocks and which is filthy, driven by a driver who
can not speak English, or one can leave it. There is no practical
alternative of demanding a clean new cab, with low fares, and a
uniformed driver who speaks English and has passed a grueling
examination on local maps.
Due to economic regulations,
operators have little incentive to even attempt differentiation. The
regulators have decided, by fiat, that consumers to not deserve to
be given such a choice.
It is tempting to include the limousine industry into the
preceding discussion of taxicab product differentiation. However,
unlike the taxicabs, some owners in the limousine industry are
attempting to differentiate themselves, just as the airlines did prior
to deregulation. For example, one operator runs a "boutique"
company suggesting that you sell "what you are""54. The company
pays drivers very well and tailors the particular driver to the
customer in an effort to retain the customer. Some tools used to
differentiate the limousine product are a uniform, hat, good
computer system, timely commissioning, networking, and
reciprocal work with out-of-town companies. 55 Examples of
quality service aside, limousine like airlines are largely
undifferentiated.
In the transportation industry, and in particular in the taxi
and limousine industries, differentiation can and should be dealt
54

MARKETING,

ADVERTISING

&

SALES,

INTERNATIONAL

December
<http://www.taxinetwork.com/egi-bin/webc/archives/1998/limo>.
TRANSPORTATION

55Id.

AND

LIVERY

ASSOCIATION,

1998
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with by strict non-economic regulation, in the form of safety and
quality regulation. This is already the case in the airline industry
where regulation can now concentrate on safety. 56 There has been
a tremendous effort towards enhanced safety and improved
medical care onboard airlines. Congress has joined the effort by
attempting to eliminate legal hurdles for airlines providing medical
assistance for in-flight emergencies.
The Aviation Medical
Assistance Act of 1998 provides liability limits for airlines as well
as for medical professionals who assist passengers in need. 57 The
act also provides that additional regulations are to be issued
regarding mandatory medical equipment and training, following a
year long assessment of in-flight deaths that were potentially
avoidable given the in-flight medical care that can be made
available.58
In the taxi and limousine industry, however, most of the
regulatory energies of state regulatory commissions continue to be
dissipated on wasteful economic regulation with the primary
purpose of protecting a state created cartel. As a result, there are
few regulatory resources left for making frequent safety
inspections, enforcing5 9insurance requirements, giving English tests,
or map examinations.
56 It is important to not make conclusions about the safety trends in

aviation based on year-to-year changes in accident rates. Fatal accident rate
fluctuates greatly from year to year, but overall, it has declined significantly over
the last few decades. See Clinton v. Oster, Jr. et. al., WHY AIRPLANES CRASH 5-

7(1992)

57 The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998, §§5(a)-(b), 49

U.S.C.A.§ 44701 (West Supp. 1998).
58

Id.
59 Complaints against limousines in Philadelphia include,
for

example, unclean vehicles; inoperable equipment in the vehicle,
including in one case the heat and lights; unsafe operation,
including reports of drivers unfamiliar with the oversize
vehicles, speeding and being involved in minor accidents; the
wrong vehicle being sent, which in some cases was not large
enough for all the riders; inability to cancel the service and
difficulty in getting refunds, even after being promised billing
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If safety and quality are properly regulated by the
enforcement of strict standards, differentiation becomes a moot
point in the limousine industry, and the differentiation factor falls
on the far left of the Pure Competition/Natural Monopoly
continuum.
3. Barriers to Entry
A primary feature of pure competition is an industry in
which entry is relatively free in the long run. It has already been
noted that barriers to entry in the limousine business are among the
lowest in the transportation industry-indeed, far lower than in the
airline industry, which has already been deregulated. Even in the
midst of a consolidation trend, 1,100 new operators entered the
limousine industry in 1999, increasing the number of nationwide
operators to 10,200. 61 Indeed, the barriers are so low in the
adjustments.
Council of Better Bus. Bureau Alert, supra note 2. But see, Permit Changes at
BWJ Airport Benefit Operators, LIMOSCENE APRIL 1999, BOBIT PUBLISHING
In
COMPANY <http://www.limousinecentral.com/LimoScene/0499_08.htm>.
contrast to Philadelphia, Baltimore has open entry. Recently, in the director of
transportation and terminal services at Baltimore-Washington International
Airport announced some favorable changes affecting limousine operators. As of
July 1, 1999, permits are not needed for each limousine in a company's fleet.
Permits are needed only for those that go to the airport. Additionally, permits no
longer have to be affixed to the windshield and they can be transferred from one
vehicle to another. Id.
60 The cost of establishing a single scheduled flight can be millions of
dollars. The cost of establishing a route network of scheduled flights is hundreds
of millions of dollars. Robert Rowen, The Dilemma of PredatoryPricing in the
The clearest
Airline Industry, 13 WTR AIR & SPACE LAW I, at 13 (1999).
example of the importance of barriers to entry in the aviation industry is the
consistent finding that physical limitations on slots and gates result in less
competition and higher prices. See, S. A. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION, Brookings, Washington, D. C.
(1986).
61 Becker, supra note 44.
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limousine business that there is ample room to raise to one million
dollars the required liability coverage. For example, a regulatory
requirement that insurance policies limits be raised would increase
barriers to entry, since drivers whose driving records were
unsatisfactory might be unable to obtain such higher limits. 62 A
requirement that cabs be frequently inspected would also raise
barriers to entry, as would requirements that cabs be cleaned and
maintained on a regular basis. A requirement that a driver pass a
strict English proficiency examination and a rigorous map test,
would also raise barriers to entry. It is in these areas that the
regulatory energies of government should be concentrated, rather
than on excluding competition and creating a cartel designed to
bilk consumers, protect incumbents, and reduce drivers to the
status of wage slaves.
In sum, the barriers to entry in the limousine industry place
the industry to the far left on the Pure Competition/ Natural
Monopoly continuum.
4. Declining Costs
A critical feature of a natural monopoly which may justify
economic regulation is the feature of declining costs. If the costs
of production decrease indefinitely as a firm gets bigger and bigger,
there is no room or even a rationale for competition since the large
firm will always have lower costs than a new entrant. However,
this feature is singularly lacking in the limousine industry. A large
limousine firm will always have some marginal cost advantages
62 The Taxi and Limousine Commission in New York City requires a

higher minimum amount of insurance be carried by taxi owners then the
minimum amount set by New York State. United Car & Limousine Foundation,
Inc. v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission QDS: 22700382,
October 23, 1998, N. Y. L. J. 28, 28. This was upheld due to the large volume
of traffic in New York City, including many for-hire vehicles and yellow
taxicabs, leading to a great number of accidents. The Taxi and limousine
Commission have determined that there is a need for greater liability insurance
coverage for those for-hire and yellow cab vehicles. Id.
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over a smaller firm-it may, for example, be able to negotiate lower
gasoline prices for its vehicle if a buys in bulk, and may be able to
negotiate a slightly lower cost on vehicles it buys in bulk. To a
large extent, however, these advantages in cost are balanced by
increased costs of managing a larger bureaucracy as the firm
expands. The lack of true declining costs in the limousine industry
can be best revealed by observing the behavior of the large
limousine firms in Las Vegas when a small competitor seeks a
license. If the large incumbent firm could in fact count on
declining costs to prevail against any competitor, it would not
devote energy and money on intervention and challenging the
issuance of a license to a competitor. It does challenge the license
to a competitor, however, precisely because it knows that the
declining costs of a large firm in the limousine industry are not
sufficient to discourage competition by a smaller firm. Here again,
the limousine industry would be placed to the left of the
continuum.
Conclusion Regarding Placement of the Limousine Industry on
the Continuum
Consideration of the four major factors which determine
whether a business is suitable or appropriate for economic
regulation-- namely, economies of scale, differentiation of product,
barriers to entry, and declining costs -demonstrates that the
limousine sector belongs to the left, on the "pure competition" end
of the spectrum. This placement leads to the prediction that
regulation of the limousine business will result in economic
inefficiencies and harm to the public. This has been experienced in
several cities that currently regulate entry. It remains to test this
prediction by the application of general economic principles.

Taxis and Limousines
V. APPLICATION OF GENERAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES TO THE
LIMOUSINE INDUSTRY

A. Price Controls
We begin this test by first reviewing the basic horn book
principles of economic analysis-the law of supply and demand.
Although these principles are quite simple, it is useful to revisit
them nevertheless in light of the fact that entrenched regulatory
establishments often ignore them entirely.
As the chart below illustrates, the demand for a product
decreases as the price of the product is increased, and increases as
the price is decreased. As an example, consider the production of
flat HDTV television sets. If the price is set at a high price, say
$10,000 per set, the number of consumers willing to pay such a
price will be quite small-perhaps no more than 1,000 consumers
nationwide. If the sets are sold for a price of $100, however,
millions of consumers will want to buy these sets. The fact that
more people will want the sets at a lower price than at a higher
price is illustrated by the following diagram which show the
demand curve D 1-D2.
Figure No. 1
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So far we have considered only how price affects demand.
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We now look at how price affects the willingness of producers to
manufacture flat HDTV sets. If the manufacturer can obtain a very
high price, it will be willing to produce a large number of sets since
the profits will be very high. As the price to be obtained declines,
therefore, the willingness to produce sets declines as well. At one
extreme, where the price is zero, the manufacturer will not want to
If the price is $10,000, however, the
produce any sets.
to produce quite a few, assuming of
willing
be
manufacturer will
course that its costs of producing and distributing the sets can be
kept at less than $10,000. This relationship between price and
willingness to produce is illustrated by the Supply Curve, S 1-S2.
Figure No. 2
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The market price will be the point at which the demand and
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supply curve intersect, as illustrated below.
Figure No. 3
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Now, consider the economic effects in the case where a
commission or other government entity decides to impose, by fiat,
a price which is different than the market price. Before looking at
these effects, it should first be noted why a commission would
want to set a price different than the market price. Like the
commissars of the old communist regimes, commission
bureaucrats must consider its own internal political agenda before
setting a price that is different than the price. More precisely, the
commission must decide whether to keep prices higher than the
market price (in order to protect the manufacturer), or lower than
the market price (in order to protect the consumer). Which of these
courses it takes is generally determined by political considerations,
which in turn is determined by whether the manufacturer or the
consumer has the most direct political influence on the commission
and its members.
George Stigler, in his landmark article, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, recognized that economic regulation (as
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opposed to health and safety regulation) was the result of the
political use of power by vested interest groups. He set forth the
following law: "Every industry or occupation that has enou gh
political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry."
Stigler's analysis results in the corollary to the basic principle:
"When an industry receives a grant of power from the state, the
benefit to the industry will fall short of the damage to the rest of
the community."64 The third law states: "The Industry which seeks
regulation must be prepared to do so with two things a party
needs: votes and resources."65 Although the proof of Stigler's
laws is best revealed by the application of higher mathematics and
calculus to the numbers reflected in the supply and demand
diagram, the underlying principle can be explained by the
following simple example:
Assume that the HDTV manufacturers have sufficient
political clout to induce the creation of a commission to set prices
on HDTV sets. Assume further that because of the incumbent
manufacturers" political power, it persuades the commission to set
prices above the market price. The commission does so, but is
careful to couch its rationale for such blatant price-fixing in the
loftiest of terms. It does so because it can not simply acknowledge
that it is setting high prices to help the manufacturer. (Such an
admission might jeopardize its other, though less direct, political
base, the consumer.) Instead, the commission will argue that it is
trying to prevent "destructive competition" or "price-wars".
Indeed, it was on the basis of similar rationales that airline
regulation was justified in 1938. It was not until the 1950's that the
mythology that economic regulation was for the "public interest"
was finally debunked. As Levine's studies in the 1950's revealed,
between 1960 and 1975, "the scholarly view of the regulatory
process changed from one of private behavior for the public benefit
63
MGMT.,

Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2

Sec. 3, 6 (1971).
64 Id. at 10-12.
65

Id.

BELL

J. ECON. &
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to one of use of governmental powers for private or sectional
gain."66
A. Down revealed a government run by individuals trying
67
Jean
to maximize a private, rather than public utility function.
among
that
Luc Migne in 1977 observed: "It seems fair to say
economists the most widely accepted theory of government
regulation is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry
regulatedand is designed and operatedprimarilyfor its benefit."
The result of setting the price too high is revealed in the
following diagram:
Figure No. 4
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Output is at 1,000 sets, far less than the one million sets
that would be produced were the price set at the market price. This
negative effect on production will, of course, be reflected in the
Gross National Product. However, the results are not only
economic in nature. From a social welfare standpoint, the setting
of a price higher than the market price means that millions of
consumers are deprived of the use of the product. From the
66 Levine, supra note 20 at 180.
67

A. DOWNS,

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

(1975).
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standpoint of the manufacturers, the setting of a price may be
beneficial since it increases their profits. From the standpoint of
the welfare of society, however, the policy of setting prices is
disastrous.
Now consider the opposite scenario in which the
commission set the price too low. It may do so for a number of

reasons. First, commissions generally lack the resources or data to
effectively and comprehensively analyze the industry data.
Second, there may be countervailing political considerations that
temporarily demand the setting of lower prices, such as an

upcoming election. The damage to productivity and the level or

marginal utility may be equally as severe.
Assume for example, that the commission sets the price of
the sets too low. Let us take the extreme example of the case in
which the commission sets the price of each set at fifty dollars. At
such a price, manufacturers will be willing to produce very few
sets since it will be almost impossible to recover their costs.
Figure No. 5
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Even the few sets that are produced will not provide a high
level of marginal utility. Since the demand for the sets at that price
will be greater than the supply, a black market will develop in
which sets are sold under the table to favored customers for a
higher price. A customer who is able to actually buy a set for fifty
dollars may find that the value of the glass in the set is greater than
the set itself, and may extract the glass for a picture frame and
throw away the rest of the set. Thus, the available sets will not go
to consumers for whom the set would provide the highest marginal
utility; rather they will go to those that are willing to waste the
most time in line waiting to buy the set. This was the primary
rationing system in the Soviet Union before its downfall. Prices for
basic goods were set lower than the marginal cost of producing the
goods. Demand at those prices was greater than supply. The good
ended up in the hands not of those for whom the good provided the
greatest marginal utility, but rather in the hands of those who had
the most time to waste in line. Purchasers could then resell the
goods on the black market for the true market price.
Consider now the application of this lesson to taxicabs and
limousines. In the case of taxicabs, resistance to allowing cabs to
charge market fares is generally based on transactional
considerations. It is argued that price competition is impossible
because taxi and limousine service is a "credence" good, which can
not, as a practical matter, be examined prior to consumption. The
example is posed of a forlorn customer waving down a taxi in a
snowstorm.
The driver, seeing the desperate straits of the
customer, decides on the spot to charge an exorbitant fare. The
customer, having no time to wait for another cab, submits to the
extortion.
It is true, of course, that there are unique pricing
considerations in the taxi industry. Like the airline industry,
pricing taxi and limousine services is more involved then is the
pricing of a consumer item, such as a HDTV set. Unlike the airline
industry, it is easier to identify and address predatory pricing
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practices in taxi and limousine services. 68 Consumers generally
68 Much has been written about predatory pricing practices in the airline

industry since deregulation. Due to the complexity of airline pricing, it is
difficult to identify and prove predatory practices. An established carrier could
conceivably lower its price on an established segment to drive its rival out of the
market or to deter a new entry. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 HAR. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975). Generally, pricing is not considered
predatory unless there is a sacrifice of net revenue with an expectation of
offsetting that loss with future gains. The ability of a competitor to overcome the
entry barrier may affect the monopolist's price. Id. at 705.
For illustrative purposes say the monopolist airline's profit-maximizing
price is $100 per ticket, but a $100 price would attract a competitors entry while
a $90 price would not. Average costs at an efficient output might be $80 to the
monopolist carrier but $91 for new entrant. In this example, the monopolist
carrier will have to choose between inducing entry at the profit-maximizing price
of $100 or retaining the entire market at the $90 price. Id. See also, Rowen,
supra note 60 at 13-16. To illustrate the complexity of airline pricing, Rowan
discusses various methods of pricing. Part of the difficulty is that airlines sell
the same seat for many different prices. This, however, could also occur in the
taxi and limousine businesses. What is not likely to occur in the taxi and
limousine business, that frequently does occur in the airline industry pricing
scheme is that airlines sell two or more different flight segments connecting to a
hub. Since an airline sells a network of thousands of connecting flights, some
use a method of valuing and allocating revenue called the "system contribution
theory." id. at 14. Here, each segment flown by one passenger is credited with
the revenue from that passenger. It is an attempt to resolve the problem of
identifying whether the passenger is flying one segment, say from X to the hub,
because the hub is his final destination. Or is he flying X through the hub,
because he needs to connect at the hub to fly to Y, his final destination. Since
that passenger would not fly either segment if not for the other, both receive
credit under the system contribution theory. Id. A different practice, called
"hidden city pricing," is sometimes used when the fare from spoke X through the
hub and continuing on to Y is lower then the fare from X to the hub alone. This
often happens where a short connecting segment connects to a long-haul route,
for example, an international segment. In this method, the airline may allocate to
the short connecting flight, a larger portion of the fare charged for the connecting
segment. An airline can charge next to nothing for the short segment if that
results in a few additional passengers flying the longer-haul segment. It is also
possible to value only the seats sold for travel on one particular segment. The
relevant market might be that individual segment. However, if an airline were
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appreciate the security of knowing in advance that there will be a
set fare on the meter, and that it will not be necessary to engage in
energetic bargaining in every case. However, there are ways other
than price-fixing to solve this problem. 69 For example, a
reasonable regulation might set three different meter fares-high,
medium, and low. At the beginning of each month, a taxi owner
could elect which of the three fares he wants to charge, and the
meter is set accordingly by the regulatory authority. The driver
would then be required to post a large numeral on the side of his
cab to indicate which of the prices he has elected to charge. For
example, a large numeral 1 might indicate the highest fare, and 2 a
medium fare, and a 3 the lowest fare.
A passenger flagging down a cab would immediately be
able to see the numeral on the side of the cab. The passenger could
either wave it off if the fare was higher than he wanted to pay and
was willing to wait for a lower fare cab, or accept the higher fare if
his time was important. If a customer called a dispatch service, he
might be advised that a higher fare cab would be available within
minutes, while a lower fare cab might involve a longer wait. At
airports, there could be two lines for cabs, a high fare and low fare.
A customer willing to pay the higher fare might be able to get a
cab immediately, while one wanting to pay only a lower fare might
have to wait longer.
In the case of limousines, the problem of pricing is actually
far less problematic. The price for contract services is presumably
agreed upon at time of contract. Generally, if not under contract, a
accused of predatory pricing, it would need to justify its price using only the
revenue attributable to that one segment. Id. at 15.
69 Prices should be clearly and forthrightly communicated in any event.
An award of close to $80, 000 was upheld in a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act violation. Concorde Limousines, Inc., v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 835
F. 2d 541, 541 (1987). The court determined that there was sufficient evidence
to support the finding that the limousine supplier's "best price" representation
violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The retailer understood it to mean
that he would receive the lowest price of all, yet the retailer did not receive the
supplier's best price. Id.
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70
customer calls a limousine service in advance on the telephone.
The limousine firm then quotes a price (usually an hourly rate). If
the rate is acceptable, the customer orders the service. If he feels
the price is too high, he may call another firm that offers a more
attractive price. In short, few of the transactional and practical
problems associated with pricing in the taxi industry are applicable
to the limousine industry. Consequently there is little justification
for regulating fare and prices in the limousine industry and few
commissions or jurisdictions attempt to do so.
This brings us to the far more severe regulatory problem of
entry control. Although only a handful of jurisdictions engage in
this type of regulation in the limousine industry the problems of
inefficiency and unfairness are extreme in those jurisdictions which
do so.71

B. Entry Restrictions
Government-imposed entry restrictions have the economic
effect of creating a monopoly. Economists define a monopolist as
a firm that is so large than it can affect the price of a product by
adjusting its own production. In a competitive market where there
are many firms, no one firm is large enough to so affect the total
supply by restricting its own output. If there is but one firm in an
industry, however, the total supply of a product is produced by that
70

The phone gives the customer great advantages in terms of

convenience, flexibility and competition. The limousine is requested to arrive at
a precise location at and time. The consumer has exclusive control over the
company patronized. The consumer retains the option of canceling an order and
calling a rival service. The phone gives the consumer the convenience to preselect a service based on personal criteria and past experience (on-time
experience, knowledgeable drivers, cleanliness of the vehicle), but where there is
price regulation, the consumer is denied the added value of shopping the market
on the basis of price. Putting Customers First: Taxicab Reform in the Greater
Toronto Area <http://www.nextcity.com/cpi/taxi.htm>.
71 Mignue, Controls Versus Subsidies in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 20 J.C. & ECON, 213, 213 (1977).
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one firm.
In regulated industries where there are a handful of firms,
those firms are often referred to a "oligopolists" (several firms) as
opposed to a monopoly (one firm). Where there are but a handful
of firms, there is a great incentive on the part of these firms to form
cartels and fix prices. In the latter part of the nineteenth century,
American railroad companies attempted to form such cartels so
that they could set prices higher than the market price and thereby
extract monopoly profits from the consumers. The problem with
such cartels, however, is that they create a huge incentive for
cheating among cartel members. OPEC provides a case example.
Once a price higher than the market price is set, there will always
be one firm that will want to benefit at the expense of fellow cartel
members by selling all it can produce of a product at the above
market price. Since the artificially high price can only be
maintained by an agreement to voluntarily restrict production, such
cheating can often cause the disintegration of a cartel. In the case
of the railroads, the major companies tried to clamp down on the
cheaters, but were stymied by the lack of any legal enforcement
mechanisms for disciplining the cheaters, and became alarmed at
the low prices their customers were enjoying. Henry Seligman
remarked at the time that "merchants are securing the benefits of
very low rates." 72 This meant lower prices of goods for consumers
as well, but cut into the profits of the railroad barons. The barons
finally looked to the powers of government to enforce their cartel.
The solution was government regulation. If the government itself
could be prevailed upon to set prices and punish cheaters who
dared to charge consumers lower prices, the force of law could
maintain the cartel. 73 In 1884, railroad magnate John P. Green
testified to a Congressional Committee on Commerce that "a large
majority of railroads in the United States would be delighted if a
railroad commissioner any other power could make rates upon their

See Mildner, supra note 1.
73 Kolko, supra note 13 at 30.
72
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traffic which would insure them (high dividends). 74 When the
Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887, it set rates
and provided for disciplinary action against any railroad that dared
to offer lower prices to consumers.7 5 But even the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act was not sufficient to satisfy the railroad
barons" thirst for monopoly profits. In 1906 the Hepburn Act was
passed by Congress which increased the enforcement provisions
against railroad which offered lower prices to consumers.76
George Perkins wrote to his superior, J.P. Morgan that "the
Hepburn bill is going to work out for the ultimate and great good
of the railroads. There
is no question but that (low fares) have been
77
dealt a death blow."

Rate regulation is only one step in creating a cartel.
Protection of the interests of cartel members requires entry
regulation and the outright prohibition of any competition. The
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 accomplished this task in the airline
industry. 78 For the next forty years after the passage of this act, not
a single trunk carrier was permitted to join the cartel. Between
1950 and 1974 alone, seventy-nine firms sought entry. Much like
the limousine industry today in Las Vegas, not one firm was

permitted entry.79 This fact is even more amazing when one
considers that the airline industry itself
s0 expanded by 23,800
period.
same
the
during
points
percentage
In economic terms, a cartel combines the economic power

74 Id. at 35, citing Hearings Before the House Comm. on Commerce,
48th Congress, Is. Secs. 1-2 (1884), (testimony by John P. Green).
Act of Feb 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat 379 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49. U.S.C.)
76 Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat 584 (codified as amended
in scattered
sections of 45 U.S.C.). (The statute set up an elaborate scheme for price-fixing
by government authority).
77 Kolko, supra note 13 at
35.
78 Ch. Col. 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
79 Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening
Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 182 (1979), at 115.
80 S. Breyer, supra note 40 at 206 (1982).
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of an oligopoly and creates an effective monopoly. A cartel
decides collectively what price to set, and limits output by
forbidding any new competitors to enter the industry. The cartel,
as an economic entity, has the same economic power as the
monopolist.
It should be noted that price and entry controls have long
been a seductive means of exercising power of the privileged few
at the expense of the public. 8 1 As early as 301 A.D., the vicious
Roman emperor Diocletian issued price and entry edicts
threatening death for any citizen who dared to compete with
established merchants or who undercut the prices of those
merchants.82 While the confiscation and imprisonment provisions
of the Nevada statute are not quite so severe, the economic
consequences
are comparable in terms of the injury done to
83
consumers.
What is wrong with a monopoly as long as it is created and
controlled by the government itself."
From an economic
standpoint, it makes no difference whether the monopoly is
privately controlled or controlled by a government regulatory
agency. As a practical matter, the private owners of the firms
which make up the monopoly will use all its available resources to
81In the history of airline regulation, as early as 1949, when
their regulatory arrangements were still being shaped, Lucile
Keyes argued that entry control regulation was a mistake. This
view gained support as empirical evidence was collected. An
industry study found many of the assumptions that had
supported regulation to be inconsistent with observed data.
Comparisons with alternative regulatory arrangements were
also possible, because air transport markets operated under
different regulatory schemes, at the international, interstate and
intrastate levels.
Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy and Public Policy, 4 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 393, 398 (Spring

1987).

8

2H. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 63 (1983).

83 NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.391 (2)(c), 706.036 (1999).
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insure that the agency acts in accordance with the interests of the
cartel members. The Nevada Statute 84 even provides a hearing
procedure whereby a cartel member can makes its views known to
the commission. Not surprisingly, the views expressed by the
cartel members are almost always against allowing in a new
entrant. The statute itself discourages new entrants from even
applying.
The diagram below illustrates why any monopoly, even a
government regulated one, results in a misallocation of resources,
higher prices for the consumer, restriction of output all in the
interest of the monopolist, and the regulatory establishment,
against the interest of the consumer.85
Where D = aggregate demand
MC = marginal cost
MR = marginalrevenue
AC = average cost
shaded area = excess monopoly profits at expense of consumer
Figure No. 6
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Samuelson, supra note 10 at 577. As Samuelson, explains: "Under

free pricing, when firms face a sloping demand curve their marginal Revenue is
below their price. Then, to the degree that such imperfect competitors
intelligently pursue their self-interest, they will not be led by Adam Smith's
"Invisible Hand" to perform the acts needed to promote the general interest." Id.
at 475.
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As Richard T. Gill of Harvard University explains: (In the
case of a monopolist), P is falling as he produces more and more
output for sale on the market. When an "average" of anything is
falling, the "marginal" of that thing must be below it. Since P is
falling for the monopolist as sales expand along the industry-wide
consumer demand curve, IR must be below AR. When the
monopolist produces at an output where MR = MC, therefore, he is
producing at an output where P is greater than MC.
The
monopolist, like the pure competitor, will maximize profits where
MR = MC; but
unlike the purely competitive case, this will not
86
mean P = MC.
As Economist Edwin Mansfield has stated, "For centuries
people have observed that when monopolies are formed, output
tends to be restricted,and price tends to be driven up".87 Indeed,
it was the basic truth of these economic principles that led to the
enactment of the antitrust laws.
C. The Limousine Industry
Although economic theory clearly predicts the harmful
effects of government cartelization and economic regulation of
taxis and limousines, it remains to examine the actual data for
purposes of confirmation. Appendix A sets forth a list of cities
which restrict entry into the taxicab business, and cities which
allow open entry. Despite rate regulation in all these cities, the
averagefare in the cities which restrict entry is higher than those
cities which do no restrict entry. It is, of course, difficult to
compare these fares with cities that do not regulate fares since
virtually every city regulates fares.
Appendix B compares cities that regulate entry and those
that do not in terms of the concentration of economic power. As
might be expected, the percentage of cabs, which are owned by the
86

Id. at 577.

87

Mansfield, supra note 47 at 570.
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three largest firms, is significantly higher in cities that restrict
entry.
Similar comparisons are not, unfortunately, available for
limousines. As noted in Appendix A, all but a handful of cities do
not restrict entry in the limousine industry, and fewer still regulate
rates. Nevertheless, a comparison between regulated cabs and
unregulated limousines provide another basis for confirmation of
economic theory. It has been noted that, prior to the deregulation
of taxicab service in Indianapolis, it cost twice as much to take a
filthy regulated taxicab to the airport than it was to rent an
unregulated 35-foot limousine complete with TV and VCR, to the
same destination. What was the only difference? Taxicabs were
regulated both by entry and price, while limousines were not
regulated by either entry or price.
The....consequences of entry 88regulation in the taxi and
limousine industry are indeed severe. Were graft and corruption
to result in the theft of such enormous sums from consumers, the
perpetrators would be given long and severe jail sentences. The
legalized corruption which takes the form of economic regulation
and entry restriction, however, is even more difficult to root out
than the illegal corruption, since the private interests which
promote it can use the administrative and judicial system to exploit
the public. Severe as the economic consequences are for the
consumer and the general public, however, they are equally as
severe for employees in the taxi and limousine industry. The social
consequences are truly catastrophic.
88

The

Interstate

Commerce

Commission,

in

addressing

the

implementation of transportation goals, must balance the desirability of new and
different types of service with the competitive impact that it could have on
existing services. Both factors of distinctiveness and competitive impacts are
weighed and considered and in resolving such conflicting considerations. While
the Commission's expert judgement is entitled to a wide range of discretion,
particularly regarding public convenience and necessity, it is not sufficient to
cloak its decision in "administrative discretion." Rather, the Commission has the
duty to avoid arbitrary use of power. See Arrow Line, Inc. v. U.S. and Interstate
Comm. Comm'n, 256 F. Supp. 608, 611 (1966).
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Around the country, there are hundreds of thousands of
unemployed persons, many of them members of minorities, who
are denied the right to create their own jobs in the industry. In
New York City, 98% of applicants, many of who are minorities,
89
are denied applications for licenses to drive small vans or jitneys.
Most of these license requests are to serve inner city areas which
are inadequately served by public transportation, or not served at
all by a regulated taxi industry which has no incentive to serve
such areas. As a result, thousands of residents of these inner city
areas have no practical means of transportation to jobs that would
enable them to get off welfare.
Taxi and limousine employees also suffer grievously under
regulation. Every jurisdiction which restricts entry creates a de
facto "medallion" system, in which the right to extract monopoly
profits is given to the interest group with the greatest political
power. In some jurisdictions, such as New York City, these rights
to extract monopoly profits are even given legal sanction, and are
bought and sold on the open market. The value of the right to
extract monopoly profits is an indication of the extent of the
exploitation of the public. In New York City, this value now
exceeds hundreds of thousands of dollars in the open market. The
average driver, of course, can not afford to buy these medallions.
Instead investors purchase the medallions. The financing costs of
purchasing these medallions goes to the investors who profit from
their sale. After the interest on the cost of medallions is paid, there
is very little left for the taxi driver himself, who often must try to
survive on no more than twenty five thousand a year in a city with
the high cost of living of New York.
1. The Experience of Deregulation
Because limousines in the United States have not been
regulated to the same extent as taxis, there has not been the need,
except in extreme cases such as in Las Vegas, to deregulate the
89 ProtectingEconomic Liberty, ISSUES AND VIEWS, (Fall, 1998), at 10.
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limousine industry. There are therefore few bases for comparison
of limousine businesses before and after regulation. Nevertheless,
the experience of taxi deregulation does provide some insight into
how the extreme regulation of the Las Vegas type might best be
reformed.
Between 1965 and 1983, twenty-one cities "deregulated"
the taxi cab industry. 9° I have put this word in quotation marks
because it represents a very broad spectrum. A 1993 study of taxi
regulation prepared for the International Taxicab Foundation
purported to compile statistics showing the effects of taxicab
"deregulation." Included in its definition of "deregulation" were
reforms that, while opening up the market, nevertheless left fare
ceilings intact. It then purported to find it surprising that cab fares
did not fall after such "deregulation". (It may be recalled that
airline deregulation involved a complete repeal of all price-fixing
by the government). The Price Waterhouse Report therefore
concludes that deregulation does not cause fares to fall. If this
were true, of course, the incumbent firms in a protected market
should be very happy to welcome competition. In fact, however,
the Report acknowledges that in the long run there was no
difference in fares in regulated as opposed to deregulated cities.91
In very few cases were fares actually deregulated, and in
most cases maximum fares, and in some cases minimum fares
continued to be set either by the regulatory agency or by the
industry itself. Not surprisingly, fares did not fall as dramatically
as in the airline industry where fares were completely deregulated.
Furthermore, unlike the limousine industry, much of taxi service is
provided either by cruising, or by waiting at taxi stands, where
there is little or no practical opportunity for a consumer to engage
in price comparison. (It has already been suggested, supra, how
the opportunity for comparison shopping for cruising or stand cabs

Analysis of Taxicab Deregulation and Re-Regulation, Price Water
House (For the International Taxicab Foundation (1993), at 6.
91 Id. at 8.
90
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might be accomplished). It is ironic that this report, which was
prepared for a major organization in the taxicab industry, attempted
to suggest that deregulation, might not have an adverse impact on
fares. The rationale for their conclusion is that since the power
brokers of the taxi industry ritually argue at hearings to protest the
license applications of potential competitors on grounds that any
competition would reduce their ability to charge fares high enough
to cover their costs and earn a fair profit.
In the limousine industry, however, there is a far greater
opportunity to provide practical means for the consumer to shop by
price. Limousine do not cruise, but rather are contracted for,
usually be telephone where the rates are quoted and either accepted
or rejected by the consumer.
With regard to the quality of the service, it should be noted
that the quality of vehicles is best insured by such non-economic
regulations as those which set the minimum age9 2 for vehicles, and
which require frequent and stringent inspections.

92

There is an appropriate place for non-economic regulation, i.e. health

and safety regulations. New York requires that taxicab and livery vehicles be
equipped with seat and shoulder belts that are visible, accessible and maintained
in proper working order and provides fines for violations. 1997 N.Y. A. B. No.
10202 221st Annual Legislative Session. N.Y. taxicabs must also display the
taxi and limousine commission's complaint telephone number on their rear
bumpers. Further, if a driver receives five complaints in a three-month period,
the driver must undergo safety training. There are also minimum liability
insurance requirements. 1999 N.Y. A. B. No. 1658 2 2 2nd Annual Legislative
Session. Unlike New York, Michigan requires a background check before of
limousine drivers before employment. 1997 MI S. B. 634 8 9th Legislature 1997
Regular Session. In Kentucky, all operators of taxis and limousines must
undergo and annual safety inspection by a certified technician. The law provides
penalties for vehicles that fail and permits revocation of license for filing
fraudulent safety inspection information. 2000 KY B. R. 112 2000 Regular
Session. In Kentucky, the operators are required to take at least 10 consecutive
hours off duty if the driver or chauffeur has been on duty 16 hours in the
aggregate in any 24-hour period. 1998 Kentucky House Bill No. 910 1998
Regular Session.
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There is a basis for comparing the quantity of limousine
service in regulated markets with unregulated markets. On the
other hand, in the Los Angeles market, for example, where entry is
not restricted, there is one firm serving 109,000 visitors. In Las
Vegas, where entry is strictly limited, there is only one limousine
operator for every 5.3 million visitors, leaving the market there
drastically under served.
2. Conclusion Regarding Regulation
The taxi and limousine industry provides a public service in
its function of picking up members of the public at the customers
choice of departure and driving them to their destination in
exchange for payment. As such, limited social regulation is needed
to ensure the safety of the passengers, the surrounding vehicles and
pedestrian traffic.93
Such regulation should cover driver
qualifications, vehicle insurance requirements and maintenance
standards.
Regulation in the limousine business is even less warranted
than in the taxicab business. Most of rationales set forth for
taxicab regulation (i.e., that under funded competitors will siphon
of lucrative profits at airports and hotels; that service is a "credence
good," that transactional impracticalities make fare competition
impractical, etc.) are not even applicable to the limousine business.
Cartels created in the limousine business behave no
differently than any other cartel. The Nevada government's
complicity in the creation of such a cartel would be considered
criminal if done by anyone other than government. In all other
areas of transportation" airlines, trucking, railroads, taxicabs
"governments have been busy dismantling the cartels and allowing
free competition, not attempting to create or perpetuate them.
By so severely restricting entry, the state of Nevada is
creating a de facto medallion system, whereby the right to
participate in a cartel and earn monopoly profits is given a value
93 Putting Customers First, supra note 21.
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and protected by government fiat. It is the creation of such
"medallion" rights which has made it so difficult for other
jurisdictions to enact reforms because it would mean destroying the
defacto, or even, as in New York City, the actual legal value9 4of the
right to extract monopoly profits created by government fiat.
The limousine market should be deregulated only to the
extent that entry is determined by rigorous non-economic standards
such as safety, insurance, English proficiency, map recognition,
health, and cleanliness.
V1.

THE RATIONALE
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

FOR

LIMOUSINE

REGULATION:

A

Those firms that enjoy oligopoly profits in an industry will
almost always enlist the aid of government to keep out the

competition and maintain their oligopoly or monopoly position.
The more powerful, rich, and influential the incumbent, the more
likely that government will bend to their will and conspire with the
incumbents to bar entry to competitors and maintain oligopoly
94 See Snow, supra note 15, at 153. As a 1976 study found:

The best evidence of the widespread existence of market
power caused by the ICCs restrictive entry policy is that
operating rights have market value. They only have value
because they have been artificially restricted. The value of
rights consists of the capitalized value of the excess over
normal competitive returns ...

Thus the policy operates to the

detriment of the public and to the benefit of the original
holders of these rights.
Id. at 20. A good example of the injustice of the certificate system was seen in
Shaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957), discussed in C.
FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 73-79
(1961). The W.A. Shaffer Co. sought a certificate, offering to provide faster and
cheaper service between South Dakota and points east. The ICC refused to grant
the certificate on grounds that even though present service was slow and
expensive, it was "adequate." Six years later, the courts reversed the ICC, but by
that time Shaffer had gone out of business. Id. at 23.
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prices to benefit the incumbents. 95 In order to maintain these
bastions of regulation, however, it is necessary to maintain a public
posture that regulation is somehow for the public's benefit. I now
examine the many objections that public regulators set forth in the
quest to maintain their power to enforce cartels and protect
incumbents from competition.
It is argued that eliminating arbitrary regulations barring
entry of competitors will lead to "fare wars, extortion, and a lack of
insurance96 and financial responsibility among operators and
drivers."
Some of this, however, is perceived to exist within the
current regulatory scheme-particularly among taxi and limousine
businesses that service airports. It is true, of course, that
competition may result in lower fares. This was proved by the
airline industry. As the experience in Indianapolis revealed, fares
in the unregulated limousine industry were lower than in the
regulated cab industry. But that did not mean that limousine
drivers earned less than cab drivers (otherwise they presumably
would be driving cabs rather than limousines). Rather, the
limousine industry, being unregulated in most jurisdictions and
thus subject to competition, became more efficient and thus offered
both better service and lower fares.
The issues of insurance and financial responsibility are, of
95 In this sense, the attitude of the government regulators who maintain
cartels is often very similar to that of the cartel members themselves, namely:
"The public be damned!"
96 Dempsey, supra note 79.
97 Quite possibly, increased competition would lead to increased value
to the limousine customers. In the airlines industry, a frequent flyer program
offers additional value to consumers in the form of a credit toward a future
flight. An airline that offers frequent flier miles in addition to the flight is
offering more product than an airline that has no such program. Further "value"
distinctions can be made between non-stop and one-stop flights, between meal
flights and those with none, and between coach and non-coach fares, similar to
the three tier taxi fares recommended herein. Robert Rowen, The Dilemma of
Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry, 13 WTR AIR & SPACE LAW I n. II
(1999).
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course, totally irrelevant to the issue of economic regulation of
fares and artificial government barriers to entry. Legitimate
regulation would include strict requirements of insurance and
financial responsibility as a prerequisite to the issuance of a
license. Indeed, if the energies of regulators were focused on
insurance, inspection of cab safety and cleanliness, rather than
insuring that incumbents are protected from competition, service
would increase as it did in Indianapolis after deregulation. This
can be illustrated by Michigan's approach to the limousine
business.
In Michigan, the Michigan Department of Transportation
("MDOT") has the authority to certify limousine businesses
following their passing an annual vehicle safety inspection and
proving adequate insurance coverage. 9s In 1996, they fully
implemented new safety and insurance regulations. First, public
hearings were used to obtain public input and plenty of planning
time was allowed to inspect the existing fleets. Prior to this, the
industry was totally unregulated. Now however, passengers can
distinguish those vehicles that have passed the safety inspection
and carry the required insurance, by the MDOT sticker in their
limousine's window. It is also claimed that eliminating the
barriers to entry to will result in more cabs and limousines, and
therefore will reduce the income of drivers and incumbent
companies.
This fiction is based on the premise that demand for cab
and limousine service will remain constant even if service is
enhanced and fares are lowered. In fact, in many cities with
regulated cab service, service is so terrible and cabs are so filthy
that citizens will look for almost any alternative to cabs, including,
as in Indianapolis, limousine service. When the majority of a city
has to wait two hours for a cab, one can imagine why the ordinary
citizen will scour the earth for someone to drive him to the airport
98 Limo Safety Inspection and Insurance Required for Registration,

MDOT NEWS, June 16, 1997 <http://www.mdot.state.mi.us/ communications/
press/files/06-16.htm>.
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rather than call a cab. In fact, however, demand for cab service
will rise, as it did in Indianapolis, where the attention of regulators
is focused on strict inspection of cabs for safety and cleanliness,
and where healthy price competition is allowed to take place. It
should also be noted that airline traffic tripled in the aftermath of
airline deregulation, and airline employment increased
dramatically.
The argument that competition will hurt the profits of
privileged incumbent enterprises is probably the oldest one in the
regulator's handbook. No business enterprise ever welcomes
competition. The most extreme form of this argument is that only
one enterprise should be allowed-a monopoly.
American
Telephone and Telegraph argued that it would go bankrupt if other
phone companies were allowed to compete. I will not document
the success of AT&T since the deregulation of the telephone
industry. There are now more telephone companies than one can
count and service is cheaper and more efficient than ever before.
Most important for those concerned about the economic well being
of incumbents, however, is that AT&T is still alive and kicking.
More than that, it is highly successful-because of, and not in spite
of competition.
There are those who suggest that consumers always grab
the first taxi to drive by, or call the biggest limousine listing in the
yellow pages, and do not care about the quality of the product.
Therefore the fruits of a free market-that the most efficient
competitor survives, and the least efficient go out of business-are
never reaped.
Customers do shop for ground transportation service where
feasible. There are locations, however, where customers are not
given the opportunity to compare and select even if they desire to
do so. For example, a non-contract limousine carrier operating at
the Hillsborough County Airport brought action against the airport
authority for challenging the constitutionality of soliciting

9 Wall St. J., supra note 18 at 35.
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customers.100 The plaintiff, Astro Limousine ("Astro") was
seeking to advertise its services at the airport. It wished to
advertise the price, nature and availability of their limousines.
Astro wanted the non-contract carriers to have their own dispatch
booth, and the freedom to solicit verbally. 0 1 The Court stated that
it did not believe that the individual and societal interest in
assuring informed and reliable decision-making takes precedence
over the substantial governmental
•• 102 interest in safety, promotion of
commerce and revenue raising.
It is difficult to support the
proposition that the fruits of a free market are never reaped
when
03
situations like this are occurring in a regulated market.1
too Astro Limousine Service v.Hillsborough County Aviation Authority,

678 F. Sugp. 1561, (1988).
Id. at 1565. The court ruled that since the airport authority had the
power to grant concessions, which would include the granting or exclusion of
limousine operators to and from the airport, it was authorized to displace
unrestrained business competition at the airport with regulation of monopoly
public service.
102 Id. at 1566.
103There are similar cases across the country where the airport authority
controls and in certain cases limits access of competing limousine businesses to
the potentially lucrative airport market. See Continental Air Transport Co. v. Il1.
Commerce Commission et al, 232 N. E. 2d 728 (Sup. Ct. of II!. 1967). (Where
incumbent carrier contested an order granting the application of another carrier
for a certificate to render direct airline ground transportation services between
the Waukegan-Great Lakes area and O'Hare International Airport.
The
Commission stated that the existing carrier was entitled to a preference after it
make known its willingness and ability to furnish the additional service. The
court reversed indicating that while the incumbent company had priority, the
Commission had given that fact too much weight. The court gave weight to the
fact that Continental had better equipment-air conditioned limos with reclining
seats and baggage compartments separate from the passenger compartments).
C.f., Airport Limousine Service v. CABS, 167 Colo. 378, 447 P. 2d 978 (1968).
(Incumbent services instituted judicial review proceedings after the Public
Utilities Commission entered an order approving expanded service by applicant
Airport Limousine Service, Inc. The court allowed the plaintiff to provide the
service, yet narrowed the allowable territory to a defined area within Denver).
See also, Executive Town & Country Services v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523
(11 t Cir. 1986). (The limousine service here brought action against the city to
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A similar argument was made against airline deregulation.
During regulation, airlines offered free liquor, and Polynesian
Pubs, because they were not permitted to compete by price and
therefore were reduced to competing by offering the most lavish
frills, even if the consumers wanted cheap and efficient service,
rather than lavish frills. Under deregulation consumers have a
choice-the cheapest economy seat, or a seat in first class with all
the amenities.
In fact, in a regulated taxi industry, no cab company has an
incentive to provide clean cabs, efficient service, or low fares,
because they do not need to worry about competition from any
entity
other
than fellow cartel members who likewise have no such
•
.
104
incentives.
Competing cab companies who were allowed to
enter the industry and were given an opportunity to establish a
reputation for clean cabs and fast service would soon attract calls
from consumers who would prefer clean safe cabs and efficient
service.
If the claim that consumers do not demonstrate
preferences were true, limousine drivers in Indianapolis would not
have taken business from the filthy regulated cabs. It is also why
the regulated cab industry fought tooth and nail against allowing
competition from unregulated limousines.
A further objection to deregulating the industry is the belief
that competition in the taxi and limousine industry is impossible
because taxi service and limousine is a "credence" good i.e. one
prevent it from regulating fares that the company could charge for trips to and
from the airport; and to prevent it from restricting advertising of any fares that
were not in compliance. The court relied on its authorization to the city to
regulate rates for public transportation pursuant to police powers of the State of
Georgia. As such, the city exercised its powers delegated by the state and was
entitled to the exemption from the Sherman Act challenge).
104 In New York City, the problem became so
pronounced that,
following suite, the court determined that the Taxi and Limousine Commission
(TLC) was authorized to adopt regulations penalizing taxicab drivers for conduct
such as being discourteous to passengers and for not using shortest reasonable
route. TLC has the authority and obligation to establish standards of passenger
service. New York City Committee for Taxi Safety v. New York City Taxi a,
Limousine Com's, 177 Misc. 2d 855, 677 N.Y.S. 2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
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that can not, as a practical matter, be examined prior to
consumption.
It is true that taxi regulations that do not require a meter or
set zone fares, and therefore permit ad hoc negotiation for
individual fares, are subject to abuse by drivers. However, such
systems are straw men, for there are other practical ways to permit
price competition while still protecting consumers from
extortionate drivers. For example, I have proposed a system
whereby all taxis are required to have meters. Meters are permitted
to be set at one of three precise price levels set by the regulatorhigh, low, and medium. Each cab would be required to place a
large numeral one, two or three on the side of their cab. The
number three would correspond to the high fare, the two to the
medium fare, and the one to the low fare. A company would be
permitted to advertise in the yellow pages that their meters are set
at the number one, two, or three price level. There would be
rigorous inspections to insure the correspondence of meter setting
unadvertised prices. Consumers on the street would have the
option of letting a number three cab pass them by, or wait for a
number one or two cab. Or, if time is of value, they may choose
the more available, but more expensive number three cab.
Competition causes the cream skimming.
There are
different ways in which riders will patronize taxi services that offer
a lower price; and taxi owners will seek out for business, those
customers whom they can serve at prices lower then currently
available.105
This competition for service improvement or
efficiencies can engender enthusiasm for deregulation.l°6
105 Alfred E. Kahn, Competition and Stranded Costs Re-Revisited, 37

NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, n.1 (Winter, 1997). While Kahn statements regard
deregulation directed at the electric industry, the concepts are applicable to any
service industry considering or experiencing deregulation).
106 Id. Kahn claims to be an enthusiast for competition, on the grounds
of his experience not just in the economy generally or with the airlines or
trucking (of which he had a personal hand in all), but based on the experience of
the electric industry, to which his remarks refer:
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Some supporters of the old bastion claim that Free Entry
led to destructive competition in the airline industry and will
likewise lead to destructive competition in the taxi and limousine
industry.
This is a favorite misinterpretation of the regulators. In
fact, anti-competitive behavior is perceived in some locations even
where regulated. One cab company alleged that the airport
authority and a corporation entered into a contract restraining trade
in the provision of ground transportation services from the
airport."" The court concluded that in this federal case, there was
The high prices that ratepayers are paying today for the
industry's past mistakes have been, in large measure, the
product of the previous system of rate base/ rate of return
regulation; it encouraged the companies to build big, capitalintensive plants--even to the point of their feeling compelled,
under the threat of the used and useful doctrine to complete
nuclear plants that might better have been abandoned. Given
the irrationality of that system, the companies had no incentive
to seek out and buy cheaper power, even at prices lower than
their own avoidable costs, because those cost savings would
have merely flowed through to their customers and the
reduction in their own production would have jeopardized the
return on their investments.
For this reason, it took
governmental compulsion to make the companies purchase
independently generated power whenever it made economic
sense for them to do so, and to set the prices of those
purchases. This led in turn to multi-billion dollar errors. So,
as characteristically happens, a regulatory system with sever
imperfections elicited a superficially plausible remedy that has
turned out worse than the disease it as intended to cure.
id. at 37.

107

All Am. Cab Co. v. Metro. Knoxville Airport Authority, 547 F.

Supp. 509, 509 (1982). The defendant company (the co-defendant) controls the
dispatching of limousines and taxicab to airport customers. The plaintiffs allege
that defendants are using this dispatching power to discriminate against taxicab
services and to monopolize ground transportation. The court emphasized that it
is necessary for a business to be an exclusive service if the operator of an airport
limousine service is to make a reasonable profit. The plaintiff was not
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insufficient interstate business to meet the requirements of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 108 This misinterpretation is used as an
argument against free competition in virtually every industry. In
classic free market theory, the regulators claim, no enterprise can
ever earn a profit because eventually free competition will attract
competitors until the point is reached where no one earns a profit.
In fact, however, producers have a wage or return below which it is
not worth it to them to work. This point is reached far before zero.
Airlines still make money for their stockholders despite free entry,
as do trucking companies and railroads. The inefficient producers
are, of course, weeded out in the competitive process, and this is a
wrenching experience for those who can not provide the same high
service and lower fares as their competitors. In a free economy
however, the market place works to assign producers to where they
are most productive. That is why the United States has one of the
lowest unemployment rates in the world (about 4%), while heavily
regulated countries in Europe have rates of unemployment
approaching a tragic 12 or 13% with all the attendant suffering and
societal dangers. If the regulators had been correct about airline
regulation, free entry in the airline industry would result in pilots
receiving zero wages. In fact, many pilots earn in excess of
$150,000.00 a year in an industry that allows free entry.
There is also the fear voiced by incumbents that
underfunded competitors in the taxi and limousine industry will
siphon off lucrative profits at airports and hotels, and limit the
ability of previously protected taxi companies from providing
required services in less lucrative markets.
This fiction is simply a variation of the conspiracy by
protected enterprises to extract subsidies from one class of
consumers and cross-subsidize another class of consumers. For
profitable, it argued, because the city actually encouraged the cab companies to
seek business at the terminal building, destroying the exclusivity of the contract.
The court concluded that the Airport Authority and its contract for the provision
of a dispatching service are exempt from antitrust scrutiny because of the public
nature of the airport and the need for reliable airport related services. Id. at 511.
108 Id. at 512.
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example, in a protected taxi industry, incumbents claim that they
should be allowed to extract lucrative profits at airports and hotels,
and then use these profits to cross-subsidize service to less
lucrative markets. If competitors who have not invested heavily in
radio-control devices take the lucrative business at airports and
hotels, incumbents will have to settle for lower profits roaming
streets for customers. This is the kind of argument that makes an
economist shudder, for it shows such lack of knowledge of the
basic principles of economics. It is like telling a physicist that
placing a metal plate between a person and the ground can
eliminate gravity; or telling a biologist that the offspring of a
person who has had an arm amputated will have offspring without
arms.

Airlines opposing deregulation used similar arguments.
They argued that competitors would siphon off profits on lucrative
routes between New York and Los Angeles, leaving the poor major
trunks with the less lucrative shorter routes. Of course, it did not
work out that way. Those airlines that could provide the most
efficient service between New York and Los Angeles won that
business, while those who were most efficient at shorter haul
traffic won that business. In the taxi industry, if the profits in
roaming are too low, cabs will leave that market, thereby reducing
the supply of cabs, and creating incentive for other cabs to enter it.
If too many cabs go to airports and hotels, creating long lines and
dead time for drivers, then drivers will leave that market and start
roaming instead. The market creates the incentives, and individual
competitors make the decisions-not bureaucrats feasting at the
public trough. Even if the theory of cross-subsidization had any
economic foundation, it is rare that the so called subsidizing
consumers are asked how they feel about being forced to subsidize
another class of consumers. In a competitive market, all producers
gravitate to those markets where they can make the most profit.
This is the result of the maximization of societal resources and
marginal utility. Even if there were merit, or truth to this fear, it
could not apply to the limousine industry, in which limousine are
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contracted via telephone appointment.'
The health and safety advocates argue that free entry will
lead to unsafe cabs and limousines. The safety bugaboo is usually
the last and most desperate argument at the bottom of the
regulator's barrel. Those opposed to airline regulation used this
argument as well, despite the fact that airline safety increased
dramatically after deregulation (see statistics cited above).
In fact, safety and insurance is the classic straw man
argument set up by the regulator. Within the airline industry, one
finds a historically relationship between accidents and public
demands for re-regulation. Illustrative of this is the Valujet crash
in May 1996 in the Florida everglades."1 0 One journalist wrote that
this accident will likely result in major FAA reform and further
regulation of the airline industry. Beyond the demands for more
extensive safety measures, the author claims that deregulation is
the "root of the evil", stating that the smaller "start-up" airlines,
like Valujet, would never have come into existence prior to
deregulation."'
A free economic market for taxis requires rigorous safety
and insurance standards for the taxi industry. Indeed, if one judges
by the atrocious conditions of taxis in New York and other heavily
regulated jurisdictions, one wonders if there is any safety or health
inspection at all in those jurisdictions.
There should be very strict requirements for safety, health,
cleanliness, and financial responsibility for the obtaining of a taxi
license. No cab or limousine should be licensed which is not
maintained regularly, and meticulously cleaned on a daily basis.
Drivers should be required to pass very tough examinations, and
should be fluent in the language of the consumers they serve. They
should be able to pass examinations in maps, car maintenance and
safety procedures. Such restrictions on licensing will, of course,
109 See Putting Customers First, supra note 67.
I1o See Robert Reno, Reno on Sunday: Assessing Impact of Valujet

Disaster,Airline Deregulation,NEWSDAY, June 23, 1996.
III Id.
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limit the supply of drivers, just as it limits the supply of doctors
and pilots. However, such restrictions are justified by the
legitimate need to protect consumers.
Once an entrant meets these strict requirements, however,
he should not be excluded on grounds that an incumbent does not
like competition, or that a regulator wants to maintain a cartel or
preserve oligopoly profits for the privileged few.
VII. CONCLUSION

As the airline industry and AT&T learned the hard way,
legitimate profits based on the offering of superior service and
lower prices are almost always higher than the illegitimate
oligopoly profits earned in the cozy and lazy cocoon of the
protected cartel. It can not be disputed that economic regulation
that creates cartels, sets prices, and excludes competition, does
inestimable harm to both the consumer and the public at large.
What experience has shown, however, is that it does equal or
greater harm to the protected producer, who grows complacent and
stagnant. Anyone who lives in a regulated taxi environment such
as New York City can test this conclusion. New York City has the
largest transportation fleet in the world-12, 000 taxicabs, 8,000
limousines and 30,000 cars for hire. 1 2 by simply picking up a
telephone and calling a taxi, documenting how long it takes to
arrive and observing the condition of the taxi.
The citizens of
Indianapolis did just that, and they threw the economic regulators
out-just as the people's representatives in Congress did with the
regulators in the CAB and the ICC. Similar popular action will be
necessary to achieve what the people did in Indianapolis. The
regulators will never do it themselves. They never have and it is
difficult to envision a scenario where they ever will.
One observer, commenting on the result of airline
deregulation, frames a key consideration for those still-regulated
112

New York's Transportation Fleet to Go "Green", West's Legal

News 9931, availablein 1996 WL 530523.
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industries. "There appears to be one fairly clear message in the
rich empirical analysis of the past two turbulent decades in the
airline industry that should influence the debate ahead: Where and
when competition exists,
consumers benefit; where and when it
3
suffer.""
they
not,
does
It has already been noted that the most extensive study of
the taxi industry every conducted by the United States government
concluded that "deregulating the cab industry would save $800
million and create 38,000 new jobs". Every day that regulators are
permitted to delay their implementation of deregulation is the loss
of irreparable resources and in the taxi and limousine industry the
loss of thousands of potential jobs for hard working Americans.

113Mark N. Cooper, Freeing Public Policy From the Deregulation
Debate: The Airline Industry Comes Of Age (And Should Be Accountable For
Its Anti-competitive Behavior), 13 SPG AIR & SPACE LAW, 1, 21, (Spring,
1999).
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Appendix "A"
Limousine Survey: Entry Regulations

City

Independents

Legal
Limousines

Illegal
Limousines

Limits Entry of Firms
Dallas
El Paso
Las Vegas
Miami
New York
Philadelphia

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

670
47
430
110
35,000
1000-2000

50+
430
Some
Some
N/A
Problem

Restricts Vehicle Types
Columbus
Denver
Detroit
Houston
San Antonio

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

100
100-200
30
644
75

None
Few
Problem
Some
Few

Open Entry
Albuquerque
Atlantic City
Baltimore
Charlotte
Forth Worth
Fresno
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Milwaukee
Portland
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
Seattle

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

100
325
1000
N/A
5
N/A
N/A
200
N/A
N/A
100
100-200
N/A
N/A
N/A
40

None
Weekends
Few
N/A
About 50
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Fewer
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Problem

Taxis and Limousines
Appendix "B"
Concentration Taxicab Ownership in Selected US Cities
City
Albuquerque
Atlantic City
Baltimore
Charlotte
Chicago
Columbus
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
El Paso
Forth Worth
Houston
Las Vegas
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Miami
Milwaukee
New York
Philadelphia
Portland
San Antonio
San Diego
Seattle
Average
Open Entry
Fresno
Indianapolis
Kansas City
San Francisco
San Jose
Virginia Beach
Average

133
250
1151
450
5700
500
2067
842
1310
250
225
2212
1201
105
2084
1827
321
12187
1444
382
672
870
643
1600

Percentage Owned by
Three Largest Firms
100.0
58.0
78.6
54.4
75.2
54.6
47.7
88.1
69.1
60.0
100.0
79.6
N/A
100.0
40.7
42.4
79.4
4.1
33.0
83.8
81.4
43.8
65.5
65.4

90
435
500
1281
535
39
478

47.8
45.5
48.8
48.4
68.2
100.00
59.8

Licensed Taxicabs
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